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Since 1969, relations between the People's Republic of
China and the United States have improved dramatically.
This phenomenon occurred primarily as a result of a reappraisal
of national interests by both nations' policy makers. In
terms of security, the United States and China now pursue
parallel security interests. In doing so, the U.S. must enact
rational policies to protect this interest, while recognizing
those of China and others.
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INTRODUCTION
For two hundred years, the United States has been
interested in and curious about China. During this era,
relations have often transformed reflecting differences in
national interest and ideology.
The United States' national interest in China is
primarily identified in three spheres: security, economic,
and cultural. In terms of security
,
it is in the interest
of the United States to pursue cooperative goals with the
P.R.C. rather than those of an adversary relationship which
were the case previously. This is especially relevant in
light of the contemporary international environment. The
economic aspect of the U.S. interest in China is one of
opportunity for American businesses. In addition, it is
important that cooperative economic and trade exchanges
between the two countries will enable both to achieve a
better level of prosperity for their peoples. In tangible
terms, each hopes to trade those services, goods, and materials
most needed by their respective economies. The cultural
exchanges between the two countries are seen as in the mutual
interest of both the United States and China. By better
understanding each other's culture, the respective governments
may be able to pursue policies devoid of conflict. It is
a popular American notion that interaction with our culture
and system will influence other nations not to want to fight

against us. This is seen as beneficial in the context that
a country which understands us will not be willing to parti-
cipate in any action intended to destroy us.
It is my hypothesis that U.S. policies relating to
China have been designed to protect all three of the national
interests, but particularly the security interest which must
take precedence over the other two.
This thesis will investigate whether the policies adopted
have actually accomplished their purpose. Upon my findings,
I shall consider whether further security arrangements are
necessary or advisable.
In order to make this investigation, a historical summary
is provided to analyze U.S. policy in the environment in which
it developed.
The work will then identify international and domestic
factors which determine the nature and extent of the U.S.
interests in China, as currently perceived.
Then, the recent policies relative to the P.R.C. will be
identified.
Since the effectiveness of U.S. security policy will in
part be determined by the capabilities of the P.R.C, the
Chinese security capability will be analyzed.
In conclusion, those policies already enacted will be
evaluated. Parameters will be suggested within which security
policies must be similarly adjudged.
This study is worthwhile due to its timeliness and
pertinence. Research sources concentrate on statements by

world leaders, official documents, and works of recognized
authors. The goal of this study is to help shed light on





A. 1921 - 1937
The period 1921-1937 marks the start of this summary of
U.S. -China relations. The period is significant not only
because it marked the forming of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) , but the interstate political maneuverings in
this period were a substantial factor in determining China's
later alignment.
In the early years of the twentieth century, a nationalist
fervor developed in politically active Chinese. Much of this
feeling was derived from, as the Chinese saw it, the unequal
treaties from and occupation by the imperialist powers
(including Japan and the U.S.). From this standpoint, it
is not difficult to see why the nationalists turned to the
Soviet Union for help. "Agents of the Russian-dominated
Communist International (Comintern) traveled to China in the
early 1920's and there helped reorganize the nearly moribund
Kuomintang Party (KMT) of Sun Yat-sen. Ml The object of this
support was not so much to create a Communist China, but
more importantly, a unified state that would expel imperialist
powers
.
The Comintern also supported the newly founded (1921)
Chinese Communist Party which had its origins in Shanghai.
In 1922, the Soviets insisted as leaders of the International
Communist Movement that the CCP cooperate with and operate
from within the KMT.
9

The alliance was justified as a tactically expeditious move
to achieve unification and independence. Ideologically the
Comintern explained to the CCP that China was not yet ready
for a proletarian revolution. Thus, the KMT was deemed the
leader of the bourgeois revolution which would transform
China into a capitalist industrial state, a necessary pre-
requisite stage before the final leap into Communism. MThe
alliance was formally consummated in January 1924.
"
2 The
tactical and strategic motives for allying the CCP and KMT
were for the unification and independence of China.
Sun Yat-sen, founder of the KMT, died in 1925 while in
Peking negotiating a settlement for the peaceful unification
of China. After some intra-party maneuverings , Chiang Kai-
shek gained control of the party, largely enabled by his
control of the Russian-trained KMT Army. In 1926 he led
this army north in an attempt to unify China militarily.
During the northward march, serious splits occurred between
the Communists and KMT, culminating in the Shanghai purge
of Communists carried out by Chiang's forces in March of 1927.
Subsequently the Soviet advisors were expelled from Canton,
Hankow, Shanghai, Peking, and Mukden. This marked a decided
shift in China's political orientation. She now appeared
less suspicious to the U.S. (in spite of the Nanking incident
when KMT soldiers attacked American residents) who in 1928
recognized Chiang's republic.
There is little difficulty in imagining the CCP's dis-
illusionment with their Russian Comintern advisors after
10

experiencing near extinction in 1927. Remnants of the
harangued party fled to and established themselves in the
South-Central provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi. It is diffi-
cult to determine who controlled the CCP initially; however,
Mao Zedong emerged here as a central party figure. The
events and environment no doubt influenced Mao's perception
of China and the world. The KMT purge of its CCP faction
had been largely urban based. This, in addition to the ill
advice from the Comintern, caused the party to stress self-
reliance and use the rural areas as a base. The first order
of business was survival. The Red Army, led by Zhu De
,
employed and perfected guerilla tactics in holding off the
KMT Army. "Between 1930 and 1933, the Kiangsi central
base alone was subjected to no less than four successive
'Extermination Campaigns.'" 3 The fifth onslaught, in
October, 1955, marked the abandonment of the Kiangsi base
and the retreat known as "The Long March."
Less than 10 ? of the 100,000 Communists who fled com-
pleted the 6,000-mile circuitous trek to Yenan. The Long
March is regarded as a significant watershed in Chinese
Communist history. During, or soon after completion of the
march, Mao achieved effective control over the party apparatus
The sheer miracle of their survival helped form a psychologi-
cal bastion in their minds. "It was the Long March -- and
the legendary tales to which it gave rise -- that provided
this essential feeling of hope and confidence, the faith
11

that determined men could prevail under even the most desperate
conditions . Ml*
The year 1937, the end-date of this segment of the
historical summary, could be argued to be the turning point
for the CCP. Some scholars have even referred to this date
as one of the "accidents" in history. For without the Japanese
invasion, it would be possible to argue that the KMT Army
would have inevitably destroyed the remnants of the CCP in
Yenan. No longer could Chiang busy himself with some 8,000
revolutionaries hiding in a remote provincial wasteland.
The date not only supplied a breathing space for Mao,
but it provided impetus to develop certain philosophical
arguments
. The invading Japanese were seen as the primary
enemy.
In Mao's view, limited allies are temporary allies
who may eventually become enemies again, but for
limited periods they can be of critical importance in
the balance of forces affecting the struggle for power. 5
The United States, once identified as the primary enemy,
was seen as a potential source of support in evicting the
Japanese invasion forces. This philosophy was also applied
to the KMT.
B. 1937 - 1945
For China, World War II began in 1931 when the Japanese
Kuantung Army moved into Mukden. The year 1937 marked the
date when their forces moved into China proper. This phenomenon
provided the situation which in essence assured the survival
of the CCP. Not only did the invasion provide the opportunity
12

to be relieved from KMT attacks, it enabled the Red Army to
gain valuable military experience which would be of later use.
In fact, Japanese attacks made little gains in areas controlled
by the CCP. In 1941, when the U.S. entered the war, the
Japanese lines with the Communists had not significantly
altered since 1938. The CCP perfected insurgency operations
in what Mao called "people's war." Some authors have described
Communist operations of the Red Army moving literally under
the Japanese Army. Not all of the CCP's gains were in
Japanese territory. The Red Army quickly filled the vacuum
created in the north and central sections of China by the
retreating KMT Army. "As Japanese pressure increased, the
Communists announced in September, 1937, their willingness
to make peace with the Kuomintang ,
"
6 under certain specified
conditions. In reality, a unified front against the
Japanese was in name only. The two Chinese factions refrained
from open conflict with each other only while preoccupied
with the Japanese forces.
Chiang's wartime policy has been depicted as a program
to lose as few forces as possible to the Japanese. He
"pursued a strategy of retreat, minimizing large-scale clashes
and hoarding American aid for eventual use against the
Communists." 7 A similar strategy could be attributed to
the CCP. Their conflicts with the Japanese were motivated
as much by subverting their hold as by gaining a future source
of peasant-soldiers to fight the KMT.
13

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor came as good news
to Chiang. Now he could depend on the United States to rid
the enemy from China while he bided his time for future
elimination of the Communists. Despite a few American voices
advocating support of the CCP, the U.S. cast its lot with
the KMT nationalists. Throughout World War II, General
Stilwell, Chiang's American military advisor, advocated a
more aggressive, streamlined strategy for fighting the
Japanese. The relationship between Stilwell and Chiang
developed into a bitter rivalry. Finally, in September, 1944,
Stilwell was given a letter by Roosevelt to deliver to Chiang.
In essence, it was an ultimatum to give Stilwell command of
the Chinese forces (including Communist) or American aid
would terminate. At this point, it appeared that Chiang's
stall was finished. However, Roosevelt changed his mind and
ordered Stilwell 's recall in October, 1944. This can be
attributed to the work of Patrick Hurley, an emissary sent
by Roosevelt the previous month. His reports not only
portrayed Chiang Kai-shek as China's only hope for defeating
the Japanese, but the only unifying force in the face of the
CCP or the Soviet Union.
On September 24, 1944, Hurley joined Chiang and
T. V. Soong in sending a message to FDR. All three
agreed that the real problem in China was Stilwell.
If only he were removed as a thorn in Chiang's side,
the Kuomintang would be able to carry out everything
Roosevelt desired of it. 8
One can speculate that if Stilwell had formed a unified
(CCP-KMT) Chinese Army, close association might have produced
14

future accommodation. In fact, during this period, the
United States had observers (the Dixie Mission) in Yenan
with the CCP. A positive rapport developed with Mao advo-
cating a conciliatory posture toward the U.S. Hurley-
destroyed any hopes of post-war accommodation between the
two Chinese factions. In Yenan, he proposed a coalition
government which Mao accepted. Zhou En-lai traveled to
Chungking to consummate this agreement and was surprised to
learn Chiang's interpretation was not what had been discussed
in Yenan with his mediator, Hurley. The proposal was now
that the CCP disband their armies and accept some minor
posts in the KMT government. Hurley went back on his
previous draft signed in Yenan, for he too demanded Chiang's
proposal as a criterion for coalition. Thus, all hopes of
what may have developed into a unified China, or even a
Communist China not antipathetic to the U.S., were dashed.
After the Japanese surrender, "the Americans airlifted
Nationalist troops to key points in the east and north." 9
The scenario in 1945 was significantly different than in
1937 in terms of territory held and in terms of popular base.
The Communists had made significant gains in the north and
central regions. The party had increased from 40,000 to more
than a million. In contrast, the KMT had lost its appeal
to the common Chinese by excessive taxes, corruption, and
economic malaise. Thus, the stage was notv set for the
inevitable struggle for power that each faction had been
waiting for since 1937.
15

C. 1946 - 1949
As stated previously, there appeared to be a possibility
in late 1944 to form a coalition government. It is important
to note that during this time, Mao appeared receptive to
the United States. America's pro-Chiang policy, advocated
by Hurley and accepted by Roosevelt, continued to hamper
any possibility of an American initiative for peaceful
resolution
.
In late 1945, Truman sent General George Marshall in a
further attempt to make peace. Now the impetus for unifi-
cation was not to better enable the allies to defeat the
Japanese. By this time, the fear was of Soviet expansion
into a weak China. Again, neither the CCP nor the KMT
could come to terms, and Marshall's orders were to support
the KMT if this were the case. The U.S. mission was welcomed
by the CCP, for "postponing civil war was clearly preferable
to an immediate showdown with the better equipped and larger
KMT armies." 10
The efforts for peace were in vain. No longer did either
party have a common enemy other than each other. From a
military perspective, the Red Army brilliantly employed
guerilla tactics, steadily increasing arms, equipment, and
personnel. Their sources were: captured from the KMT,
Soviet-captured Japanese supplies, and from the KMT defectors
The civil war was brief, 1947-1949.
It is not important to discuss the tactical intricacies
which brought Communist victory in 1949. In terms of the
16

five crises of political development presented in the work
entitled Crises and Sequences in Political Development
, a
construct may be developed which may provide a better explana-
tion for Communist victory. In terms of the five crises
(identify, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distri-
bution)
,
the CCP in 1945-1949 was much more adept in resolution
than the KMT.
Identity: During the Japanese occupation and after, the
Communists were able to expand their effective influence over
vast expanses of rural areas. After the Japanese defeat,
the CCP was already regarded as the appropriate government
in its areas.
Legitimacy: During the occupation and after, the peasant
population was more "in-tune M with the CCP policies vis-a-vis
those of the KMT. By 1945-1947, the legitimacy of the
Kuomintang was in question. It appeared that they were more
interested in re-establishing the status quo than alleviating
the rural and urban squalor existing throughout China.
Penetration : The KMT's sphere of control during the occu-
pation diminished. In contrast, the CCP made significant
progress in expansion of influence and control. The CCP
was able to successfully maintain an "effective presence of
a central government throughout a territory over which it...
exercise (d) control." 11 This was not the case with the
Nationalist regime. If the KMT Army was not in a vicinity,





Distribution : The superior ability of the CCP to promise
more equitable distribution was not only a function of their
land reform promises. The Japanese and later the Nationalist
government exploited the peasantry in typical Chinese
tradition.
The Japanese allowed the gentry their traditional
economic privilege of exploiting the peasantry. In such
cases, the landlord appeared to the peasant not only in
his old role as economic oppressor but also in the new
role as national traitor. 1 ^
The KMT offered even less promise. After the Japanese
occupation, the enacted policies offered little relief to
the peasant population. "The old order of landlord control
continued under the returned Kuomintang as it had under the
Japanese." 13 Thus, the CCP was able to offer a better "deal"
to the preponderant peasant population in terms of distribu-
tion -- it promised land.
Participation: It has been implied in the above segment
that one of the five facets assuring the CCP's success was
its promise of better distribution. One cannot fail to
agree that Mao's idea of peasant utilization played a major
role in his party's ultimate victory.
Though they used old and tainted leadership at times,
they created new organizations among the poorer peasants
and even among the women, the most oppressed group in
Chinese society. 1
H
The participatory lure that the CCP offered the peasant
was in joining the Red Army, the CCP itself, and most impor-
tantly in the Poor Peasants Associations. These institutions
enabled the peasant to feel he had a sense of shaping his own
18

destiny, something he had never felt in Nationalist or
Imperial China.
In this section of the historical summary, it should be
pointed out that the American interest in China suffered.
Also, a construct was developed which purports to show the
Communists' inevitable victory by their superior ability to
resolve crises.
D. 1949 - 1960
The years 1949 - 1960 are noteworthy in that it is in
this period that China and the Soviet Union were, for practical
purposes, aligned. It is also in this period that fears in
the United States of a Communist monolith were their
greatest
.
On October 2, 1949, the Soviet Union officially
recognized the People's Republic of China, one day after
its proclamation. From a Soviet perspective, the ultimate
victory of Mao had not seemed possible until 1948. Until
this time, Moscow had not leaned significantly towards the
CCP vis-a-vis the KMT.
After the military victories of 1948 gave the Chinese
Communists possession of important urban and industrial
centers, particularly in Manchuria, Mao Tse-tung appealed
to the Soviet Union for trained technicians and engineers. 15
As a result of this turn of events, the Soviet Union
recognized the viability of the CCP. It is during this
period that economic collaboration in the form of planning,
trade agreements, and credit began. In December, 1949, Mao
traveled to Moscow to begin negotiations. (It is interesting
19

to note that this was Mao's first trip outside China.) One
source states that Mao had figured China's needs as being
in the order of U.S. $2-3 billion. 16 Mao entered a
seller's market in traveling to Moscow. During the time of
his trip, any hopes of U.S. recognition of the PRC were
eliminated. All American diplomatic personnel were with-
drawn from Peking when the U.S. consular establishment
was confiscated. This may have been a tactic to signal an
anti-U. S. /pro-Moscow posture. However, this in effect
weakened China's position in negotiations. She now had no
other alternative but to negotiate on Stalin's terms.
Perhaps as a result of this, China did not fare as well as
she had hoped.
In actuality, Russian financial aid was very limited,
accounting for only 3 percent of total Chinese state
investment for economic development during the period
of the First Five Year Plan. 17
The reaction in the United States to the "loss" of China
was dramatic. It is during this period (1949 - 1955) that
to have had associations with Communists was devastating.
Senator McCarthy led a campaign to expose and ruin any
American who had Communist sympathies. In this "Red Scare"
atmosphere, "NSC-68 served as a 'call to arms,' a rallying
cry for the U.S. and its allies to drastically increase their
own military preparedness to resist a perceived Soviet
threat." 18 If there were any doubts in those privy to this
study, Korea served to confirm its validity.
20

It is doubtful that Peking advocated the June, 1950,
North Korean attack. One must not forget that the P.R.C.
was less than one year old.
The Chinese leaders certainly could not have
welcomed a war of potentially grave international
consequences in a bordering land at a time when they
were preoccupied with the internal consolidation of
the new state, when they were beginning to demobilize
much of the Red Army, at precisely the time their best
military units were being deployed on the southern coast
for the anticipated invasion of Taiwan, and when the
opening of the land reform campaign just had been
announced. 1 9
Nevertheless, China, faced with an American force on
its borders in November, 1950, felt compelled to attack.
To the Chinese, it seemed imminent that not doing so would
surely invite not only American forces, but a KMT invasion
from Chiang's Taiwan as well.
In China, the war proved to be a valuable political
victory. It served as a demonstration to the Chinese
people that she had fought the major power in the world and,
in her view, won. Economically, the costs of the Korean
War were great. The 1950 treaty with the Soviet Union had
shown its worth in the realm of military aid. But the war
also may have planted the seed of rivalry between the P.R.C.
and the U.S.S.R. Before the Korean War, the major foreign
influence in North Korea was the Soviet Union. With the
massive influx of Chinese soldiers, the P.R.C. changed this
relationship. After the war, the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C.
granted North Korea U.S. $250 and $200 million, respectively
21

It is significant that China granted a comparable amount
in light of the fact that she was going into debt to the
U.S.S.R. in her own reconstruction scheme.
As stated previously, the Korean War confirmed American
anxiety about Communist intentions and, more specifically,
it "created mutual suspicions and fears that were to poison
Sino-American relations for most of the 1950's and 1960 's,
initiating two decades of open confrontation." 20 In 1955
and 1958, incidents over the Taiwan Straits between the U.S.
and P. R. C. reinforced the confrontation between the two
states. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was
created in September, 1954. Not only did China feel encircled
militarily; she was ostracized from the world community by
being denied access to the United Nations. In addition, she
had restrictive trade policies placed on her and witnessed
the U.S. Asian allies receive large-scale economic and
military assistance. This is not to blame the American
policies exclusively for China's anti-U.S. posture. It can
be argued, however, that the U.S. policies limited any
options for rapproachment with the P.R.C.
While Sino-American relations were at odds, developments
starting in the mid-1950's gave birth to Sino-Soviet tensions.
Few Americans recognized this developing rift and the two
countries were still considered inexorably linked. In
1956, Khruschev delivered the famous de-Stalinization speech.
In Peking it was viewed as a serious attack on the legitimacy
of the ideological tenets of the entire Communist bloc. The
22

inferences against the Stalin "cult" of personality surely
had implications of an insult to Mao. Most fundamentally,
the speech proposed a more peaceful tone in dealing with
the West. China had felt that the cause of World Communism
should be aggressively pursued with the U.S.S.R. as the
leader.
In November, 1957, Mao attended the Moscow conference
of Communist Parties. (His second and last trip abroad.)
Here Mao delivered his contribution to famous Communist
speeches. It has commonly been referred to as the "east
wind prevails over the west wind address."
This was generally interpreted at the time to mean
the socialist camp was prevailing over the imperialists.
But there were undertones of a different theme. . .
there was here a distinct suggestion that by "East"
was meant the underdeveloped countries of the Third
World of which China was a part, whereas the term "West"
embraced the industrialized countries of North America
and Europe -- including the Soviet Union. 21
The Mao speech can be regarded as a retort to the
Khruschev address the prior year. It signaled to the Soviet
Union that China was not pleased with her world strategy
and would increasingly act unilaterally in its actions.
Thus the Soviet Union was no longer accepted by China as
the authoritative ideological voice in the Communist bloc.
In addition to ideological and political differences,
Mao failed at the conference to secure additional economic
aid from the Soviet Union.
Mao in effect demanded that the European members
of the bloc stop their own economic progress until
they had raised the economically backward Asian sector
to the same economic level, so that all socialist
23

countries might advance together into the state of
Communism. 2 2
There is little wonder how this thesis was received in
Moscow. The Chinese leader returned to Peking with only a
promise from Moscow to provide nuclear weapons prototypes.
In February, 1958, China initiated The Great Leap
Forward campaign. This was a clear break from the Soviet
economic model for development. The Maoist version of
achieving a Communist Utopia no longer depended on passing
through the industrialized capitalist phase (the antithesis)
of social structure. Proper Communist forms of social
organization were the precondition rather than a high level
of productive forces. The "Great Leap" depended heavily
on the voluntarism of the masses. The campaign was an
economic disaster marked by food shortages, lack of planning,
and an exhausted labor force. The overall analysis of the
"Great Leap" indicates that it was an attempt by Mao not
only to break with Moscow, but more importantly, to demonstrate
the superiority of the Chinese "line." As a result of the
failure, many top officials expressed grave doubts about Mao.
In the spring of 1959, Peng De-huai, the Minister of
Defense, traveled to Moscow. "During the course of his
travels, Peng expressed to Khruschev and other foreign
Communist leaders his displeasure (which coincided with
Soviet displeasure) over the policies of the 'Great Leap'
and the leadership of Mao." 23 After this trip, Peng openly
criticized Mao over the futile "Great Leap" program. In
24

addition, Khruschev announced that he would not deliver the
nuclear weapons prototypes previously promised. It is
clearly reasonable to understand Mao's suspicions of Peng's
loyalty. The Peng-Mao confrontation came to a head at
the Lushan Plenum in July, 1959. Essentially Mao presented
a risky choice -- Peng or him. If the CCP wanted Peng,
Mao said he would "go to the countryside to lead the
peasants to overthrow the government." 21* Peng was promptly
sacked, which obviously indicated that there still existed
a schism between the Sino-Soviet leadership.
A factor further dividing China and the Soviet Union
developed over the Sino-Indian border disputes in 1959.
"Instead of exerting pressure on New Delhi, Moscow adopted
a neutral stance and continued its economic aid to India." 25
The culmination of the Sino-Soviet split begin in 1960
when China initiated a literary ideological attack on the
U.S.S.R. The article, entitled "Long Live Leninism,"
accused the Soviet officials of bastardizing Leninist
principles. The tactic, doubtlessly Mao inspired, was to
exert pressure on Moscow to change her previously mentioned
policies. Khruschev's response was decisive. Not only were
ideological counterattacks taken; all Soviet advisors and
technical experts were recalled.
In summary, the period of 1949-1960 can be characterized
initially by a P. R.C. -U.S.S.R alignment against the U.S.
The Sino-Soviet split, from a Chinese point of view, can be
attributed to Russia's niggardly aid program and softened
25

policy to the U.S. From a Soviet perspective, China appeared
as a radical adolescent, breaking away from the ideological
fold before she was ready. By 1960, the trilateral relation-
ship (U.S. - U.S.S.R. - P.R.C.) had developed in varying
degrees of mistrust between the three states.
E. 1960 - 1968
The years 1960 - 1968, the years of the Vietnam War,
are best described as non-aligned for China. Whether this
was perceived in the United States, the relationship among
the three stages had developed toward a triangular configura-
tion. As the direct threat of the U.S. lessened after 1965,
China's perception of the danger from the Soviet Union
increased.
There are several important events/issues in the Sino-
Soviet relationship which demonstrate this rift during this
period. They are: North Korea, Albania, Cuban Missile
Crisis, Vietnam, India, Sino-Soviet border disputes, the
Cultural Revolution, and Czechoslovakia.
In 1961, North Korea signed treaties with both the U.S.S.R,
and P.R.C. The contents of the script were remarkably
similar. The significance is that it is viewed as a
demonstration of the competition existing between the two
states. The treaty with China, signed five days after the
Soviet version, can be attributed to a Chinese desire not




At the 22nd CPSU Congress in October, 1961, Khruschev
denounced Albanian behavior as similar to that of the P.R.C.
He further called on both Albania and China to return to
the true Communist path. Zhou En-lai, also attending the
Congress, delivered an address giving China's support to
the independent-minded Albanians. The result was that this
had no help in thawing Sino-Soviet relations. For Albania's
punishment, Khruschev withdrew, as had happened a year prior
in China, all advisors and technical experts.
In October, 1962, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. became embroiled
in the Cuban Missile Crisis. This provided a splendid
opportunity for Chinese criticism of Khruschev's reckless
adventurism by deploying missiles in Cuba. When the missiles
were returned, China again grasped the occasion to state
that Khruschev had shown weakness in capitulation. There is
little doubt that, while claiming he had accomplished what
he had set out to do, Khruschev had lost face in the eyes of
the Chinese.
In 1961, the American presence in Vietman was being felt
in China. This development seemed a viable threat to the
P.R.C.
Given the debility of Ngo Dinh Diem's Saigon regime,
it could safely be assumed that the United States would
shortly assume the main burden of the war and greatly
increase its military strength in that strategic area
bordering on China. 26
Perhaps the potential situation was viewed in Peking as
a possible repeat of the Korean War. An invasion of North
Vietnam by U.S. forces would again put an aggressor on her
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borders. The danger was real, exacerbated by the Sino-
Soviet split which might have precluded Soviet support.
In 1964-5, the U.S. significantly escalated its presence
in Southeast Asia. Both the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. aided
North Vietnam; however, neither could agree on a policy on
how to do it. Fortunately, the U.S. sent numerous signals
to China indicating no action would be taken to endanger her
sovereignty. Both China and the U.S. exercised extreme
caution and non-provocation in their unofficial communications
and actions with each other. There is little question that
either wanted a direct confrontation.
The Sino-Indian border clashes can be viewed as a tactical
victory over India but a strategic loss for China. There
had been a border dispute between the two regarding the
areas in the extreme Northeast and extreme Northwest of
India. The Chinese view their October, 1962, invasion of
these regions as responses to Indian provocations. After
inflicting heavy casualties on the Indian Army, China uni-
laterally withdrew its forces to areas considered theirs and
demanded that India keep its forces 12.5 miles back from
the "Chinese' 1 border. Essentially India was presented with
a fait accompli. The long-term impact was not so promising
for China. The Indians, although claiming a non-aligned
posture, have since tilted toward the U.S.S.R.
Since the early 1960 's, the Soviets and Chinese have
experienced their own border difficulties. "In 1962 they
reached a point of high tension when thousands of Kazakhs
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and Uighurs left China for the Soviet Union." 27 Since
that time, border incidents between each country's soldiers
have occurred on an irregular basis. These clashes reached
a peak in 1969 when a serious military confrontation
occurred at Chenpao Island on the Ussuri River. Several
months later, another clash occurred in Sinkiang Autonomous
region. Since that time, little has been accomplished to
resolve the territorial disputes save defusing of an all-
out war
.
The Cultural Revolution of 1966-1968 did little to help
Sino-Soviet relations. In fact, it was an extremely chaotic
period where China had cut herself off from the world.
During this period of extreme militancy, China did not enjoy
good relations with most nations, including the Soviet
Union. This phenomenon confirmed Soviet perceptions that
Mao was truly mad and that China was a dangerous and
unpredictable neighbor.
From a Chinese perspective the Soviets were equally as
dangerous. This point was well demonstrated to Peking in
1968 with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. This action
may have been viewed as a signal or precedent that greatly
affected not only China's view of Russia, but the world as
well
.
In the period of 1960-1968, the lesson in this section of
the summary is on gradually deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations
based on ideological, political, and territorial issues. It
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is during this time that official Chinese rhetoric included
the U.S.S.R. with the U.S. as "enemies of the people."
More tangible, the real threat lay in the steady Soviet
military buildup along the northern frontier. Relations with
the U.S. were without any major confrontations as was the case
in the previous decade. This is the backdrop for the next
period discussed.
F. 1968 - 1980
The most recent period discussed here contains a large
number of events which significantly altered the U.S. -
U.S.S.R. - P.R..C. trilateral relationship. As the period
before this indicated, the links between the three had
developed into three bi-laterial associations. These twelve
years are especially important because of the continuous
approach to a U.S. - P.R.C. rapproachement . Also during this
period the U.S. - U.S.S.R. relationship continued to be
one of maintaining the status quo. This section of the
summary will chronologically outline those events and issues
which demonstrate the above described relationships.
Before 1968, two events transpired that are useful to
demonstrate the tone that was present when Richard Nixon
assumed the presidency in 1969. In 1966, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee heard testimony from numerous scholars
and Asian experts who argued that the U.S. had misinterpreted
China since World War II. The picture painted was that
China pursued its interpreted antagonistic course as a
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result of the prevailing environment created by the outside
powers (U.S. and U.S.S.R.).
In 1967, an article, authored by the soon-to-be
President, appeared in Foreign Affairs
. Nixon's tone
differed little from his previous anti-communist inclinations.
However, the article did leave a "bait" in reference to
China. The "bait" was that the U.S. could perhaps alter its
own policies toward China if she would reciprocate. Also,
in 1968, Nixon reiterated this stance in an interview in
U.S. News and World Report
. No doubt these two new approaches
were read in Peking. Evidence of the Chinese hierarchy's
awareness of U.S. developments is provided by Henry Kissinger
while in Peking in July, 1971. Zhou En-lai, during negotia-
tions, presented Kissinger the text of a Nixon speech made
several days prior in Kansas City. In his book, White House
Years, Kissinger states that not only was he ignorant of the
contents, but of the event as well.
Events in 1969 further broke ground for the U.S. - P.R.C.
reconciliation. The most significant were: Nixon's Guam
Doctrine and disengagement from Vietnam, Sino-Soviet border
clashes, and China's hints at peaceful coexistence.
After the success of the Tet offensive (1968) , whan
it was clear that America intended to pull out of
Vietnam, the Chinese began to worry more about the
Russians on the north and less about the Americans
on the south. 28
The Nixon Doctrine, perhaps when first proclaimed in
1969, was not intended as a major foreign policy announcement.
The tenets of the speech, later refined, were:
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1. The United States will keep all its treaty commit-
ments
.
2. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power
threatens the freedom of a nation allied with
us, or of a nation whose survival we consider
vital to our security and the security of the
region as a whole.
3. In cases involving other types of aggression we
shall furnish military and economic assistance
when requested and as appropriate. But we shall
look to the nation directly threatened to assume
the primary responsibility of providing the man-
power for its defense. 29
This clearly denoted a less activist tone in the sense
that it implied we were not so apt to directly intervene
in Asia and thus represented less of a threat to China.
In March, 1969, there occurred further border skirmishes
between the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. The importance of this
conflict outweighs those previous in that both powers
significantly increased military forces along their mutual
borders. With an increasingly hostile threat mounting to
the north, it is not difficult to discern Peking's real-
politik motives in seeking a less antagonistic posture
toward the U.S. Several factors highlighted this new develop-




"The first aim of China's
traditional foreign policy has therefore been defense against
Inner Asia." 30 And second, the proximity of the Soviet
threat, balanced against the inevitable U.S. disengagement




As a result of the above scenario, the Chinese initiated
their hints for a U.S. - P.R.C. reconciliation.
Soon after Nixon's election, Peking suggested
publicly that "peaceful coexistence" should be
pursued by America and China. Then, at a reception,
a Chinese diplomat told an American that the two
nations ought to resume their suspended ambassadorial
discussions [in Warsaw]. 31
In 1970 a number of prodding events set the stage for
the U.S. and P.R.C. to come together. The main events were:
a Soviet suggestion for a pre-emptive strike on China,
Nixon hints, and a conversation between Mao and Edgar Snow.
In July, 1970, a senior Soviet official at the SALT
talks, reportedly broached the idea of a Soviet-American




Evidence suggests that this Soviet feeler reached Peking which
undoubtedly confirmed Chinese fears of the Soviet Union.
During 1970, the Nixon administration made numerous
advances to China. In an October news conference, "Nixon
made reference to the People's Republic of China. This
marked the first time an American president had publicly
used the real name of the Peking regime." 33 To further
enhance the possibility of opening a dialogue, "between
November 1969 and June 1970 there were at least ten
instances in which United States officials abroad exchanged
words with Chinese officials at diplomatic functions." 31*
In August, Edgar Snow, author of Red Star over China and
an acquaintance of Mao, interviewed the aging leader for a
Life magazine article. In this interview, one statement
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confirmed China's aspirations toward the United States. In
essence, Mao indicated that he was willing to meet with
Richard Nixon, as the President or as a tourist.
The year 1971 proved decisive in U.S. - P.R.C. relations.
It marked the secret Kissinger trip to Peking and a resultant
power struggle within the CCP.
In July, Henry Kissinger (at that time the President's
National Security Advisor) secretly traveled to the Chinese
capital to discuss prerequisite issues for the proposed
Nixon visit. It proved, when announced in the U.S., an
exciting development. This did not appear to be the case in
China. So many years of ideological conflict with the
United States could not easily be set aside. The radical
element in the CCP, led by second-ranked Politburo member
Lin Biao, vehemently opposed a detente with the U.S. The
outcome of the Nixon trip and further U.S. - P.R.C. recon-
ciliation denotes that the moderates, led by Zhou, prevailed.
In September, the radicals' case was lost by virtue of Lin's
purported plane crash while escaping to the U.S.S.R.
Late that year, the P.R.C. formally entered the community
of nations by being admitted to the United Nations.
In 1972, the Nixon trip and the resultant Shanghai
Communique" of February 27, 1972, charted the new relation-
ship between the two countries. Kissinger states that
...it would thus become a touchstone of the relation
ship between two countries whose diplomatic ties would
remain unconventional as long as Washington continued
to recognize Taipei as the seat of the government of
all of China. 35
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Only two significant developments between the P.R.C.
and U.S. took place between 1973 and 1975. In May, 1973,
both countries established liaison offices in each country.
The issue thwarting full diplomatic recognition remained the
status of Taiwan. In late 1975, President Ford traveled
to the P.R.C. and later announced the Pacific Doctrine.
The announcement in respect to China introduced nothing
significantly new. It did, however, reaffirm both country's
position on respect for sovereignty and peaceful coexistence.
Ford also stated:
I reaffirmed the determination of the United States
to complete the normalization of relations with the
People's Republic of China on the basis of the
Shanghai Communique". 36
The years 1976 - 1980 also proved significant in the
rapprochement. In 1976, Mao and Zhou both died. The intra
-
party power struggle that developed might have affected the
outlook toward the U.S. It is significant to note that the
moderate Deng Xiaoping was purged (not for the first time)
.
Later that year, the "Gang of Four" was arrested. That
signified a victory for the more moderate over the radical
anti-U.S. elements in the Politburo. As can be expected,
Deng reappeared in 1977 as a fully rehabilitated member of
the Politburo.
The first two years of President Carter's administration
marked no significant developments in the normalization tra-
jectory. In December, 1978, he announced that the two
countries would extend full diplomatic recognition to each
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other as of January 1, 1979. The decision was based on
Chinese compromise; they no longer called for liberation
of Taiwan by any means. Also that month, Vice-Premier
Deng Xiaoping visited the U.S., commemorating the full
normalization of relations. The recognition of the P.R.C.
now equalized the U.S. relationship with the P.R.C. and
U.S.S.R. On the surface, the relations of the two nations
exemplified "evenhandedness .
"
The first test of this new reconciliation occurred
barely two months after its inception. China invaded
Vietnam supposedly to punish that country for its own
invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia). Below the surface, an
incentive must have been the Hanoi - Moscow Treaty of
Friendship that was signed in November, 1978. The event
did not appreciably alter the newly established U.S. - P.R.C.
tie.
The events of 1980 have thrust the two countries closer
than perhaps could have been previously imagined. The
January Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided the impetus
of a more serious consideration of playing the "China Card."
This concept suggests enhancing U.S. - P.R.C. relations as a
means of thwarting the assumed expansionist Soviet Union.
Also in January, U.S. Defense Secretary Brown visited
China. Even though the trip was claimed to have been arranged
prior to Afghanistan, it clearly represented a signal on the
eve of Russia's invasion. Also in that month, the P.R.C.
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terminated talks with the Soviet Union regarding their
differences, specifically on the border disputes. A further
development that month was the granting to China the status
of "Most Favored Nation" in trade by the United States.
Early in 1980, it appeared that, with the announced
sale of U.S. "military related" technology to China and with
the granting of most favored nation (MFN) status to her, in
which neither case applies to the U.S.S.R., the United States
had decidedly tilted toward Peking at the expense of Moscow.
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II. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE U.S. INTEREST IN CHINA
This chapter shifts from the past to the contemporary
and discusses international and domestic factors which
determine the nature and extent of the U.S. interests in
China. The full diplomatic recognition and granting of MFN
trading status reflect that the U.S. perceives it still has
a positive interest in China.
International factors, in its usage here, are defined
as those external issues and events which have had impact
on U.S. policy and action. The primary international factors
which have significantly influenced the U.S. perception of
interest in the P.R.C. are: the Sino-Soviet conflict, the
growing Soviet threat worldwide, the domestic and foreign
policies of the P.R.C, Sino-Japanese relations, and China's
role with native insurgent Communist parties.
As stated previously, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated
through the 1960's, culminating in border clashes in 1969
in Sinkiang and on the Ussuri River. The outcome of the
territorial conflict has yet to be determined. It is
important to note that "the Soviets had about 12 under-
strength divisions for immediate operations against the
Chinese in 1964... by the early 1970 's nearly 45 divisions
were stationed along the Soviet - Chinese border or in
immediate reserve." 37 This development, exacerbated by the
1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia, had ominous
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implications in Peking. From this period to the death of
Mao and Zhou, China made gestures to Moscow suggesting
reconciliation which to Peking no satisfactory response was
reciprocated. After these deaths, power struggles within
the CCP truncated any moves regarding Moscow. The emergent
leaders, Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping, reiterated standard
Maoist claims of Soviet socialist imperialism to tilt more
toward Peking than Moscow.
In February, 1978, Hua set forth conditions for improving
relations with the Soviet Union. Essentially he stated
maintenance of the border, disengage military units,
negotiate boundary questions, and Soviet troop withdrawal
from Mongolia were the prerequisites for normalization.
Some progress had been made in reducing tensions by initiating
negotiations on October 17, 1979. However, the January, 1980,
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan evoked cancellation of the
talks. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said,
"The invasion of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan threatens
world peace and China's security. It creates new obstacles
for normalizing relations between the two countries." 38
The vastly enlarged Soviet military posture on China's
borders, inflamed by the recent use of Soviet military power
in Afghanistan, has precipitated as an international factor
that has had an impact in determination of the nature and
extent of the U.S. security interest in China. Essentially,
both nations share the perception of the U.S.S.R. as the
primary adversary. China's antipathy to the U.S.S.R. is in
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the interest of the U.S. in the context that China serves
as an added security concern to the Soviet Union.
The second international factor affecting the U.S.
interest in the P.R.C. is the growing threat of the tech-
nologically advanced Soviet military juggernaut. "The
foreign policy of the Soviet state advances through both
the presence and use of power." 39 No longer does the
United States enjoy an unchallenged position as the world's
primary military power. This is evidenced by the fact that
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. now have rough strategic weapons
parity. The U.S.S.R. has a quantitative superiority in
Warsaw Pact conventional forces. (A quantitative comparison
between the U.S. and Soviet armies is provided in Table 1.)
Not only do the numbers point this out; Russia has shown a
greater tendency to project power through military means:
1975: U.S.S.R intervenes in Angolan civil war via
Cuban proxy army.
1977: U.S.S.R. intervenes in Ethiopia with Cuban
proxy army.
1978: U.S.S.R. initiates significant arms transfers
to Vietnam for use in Kampuchean invasion; con-
cludes treaty of alliance with Vietnam.
1979: Soviet and Cuban advisors train and provide
support for South Yemeni invasion of North
Yemen.
1980: U.S.S.R. invades Afghanistan with 85 - 100,000




Asia has not been spared from the enhanced Soviet military
capability. They perhaps do not have the necessary land forces
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45-odd divisions on China's frontier make possible something
other than what is necessary for defense. It is feasible
to suggest that the Soviet forces in the area could accomplish
limited objectives in China beyond the Chinese capability to
dislodge them. This is especially relevant when considered
in the context that the Soviets may perceive their military
advantage waning. A scenario could be a pre-emptive strike
on China's nuclear missile sites followed by a rapid invasion
and withdrawal from one of the Chinese outlying provinces,
such as Sinkiang or Manchuria. "Humiliating China and dis-
crediting its leadership might be seen as a catalyst to
provoking a general realignment of international forces."'* 1
Perhaps the most significant growth in Soviet military
strength in Asia is in sea power. She now has a Pacific
"blue water" navy which has the capability of cutting the
major sea lanes. In a worst case situation, U.S. naval
power could be denied access to Asia via the Pacific Ocean.
U.S. Naval Power is the central element, the linch-
pin, of any efforts to maintain sea lines open to Japan
and allied East Asian states. Unfortunately, there is
a growing concern over the U.S. Navy's ability to deal
with any Soviet challenge in the East Asian area. 1* 2
Japan and Korea, cut off not only from the United States,
could be substantially cut off from Persian Gulf oil by
successful blockage of the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits.
This would, in essence, isolate all of East Asia. The ramifi-
cations on the resource-dependent economies of this region
are significant. Would a nation like Japan risk economic
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disaster and possible military conflict in supporting the
United States in this scenario? It is likely that, under
extreme pressure, these countries, faced with a successful
Soviet naval expedition, would choose neutrality out of
self-interest and survival.
In addition to the growing Soviet military force world-
wide, she has a great capability to disrupt regional stability
by providing native insurgents in large numbers and military
equipment that no other state is either willing or able to
provide.
As a result of this growing Soviet military threat, the
P.R.C. is viewed in a new light vis-a-vis ten years ago.
This phenomenon has had an impact on determination of the
extent of U.S. security interests in China similar to that
of the Sino-Soviet conflict. In the international system
of one nation gaining military advantage over others to a
degree that is perceived threatening, there has historically
been a tendency to form alliances and agreements to balance
against the threat. In the event of a shift of power in
Northeast Asia, it is in the U.S. security interest to main-
tain alternatives. The P.R.C. is viewed in its contribution
to maintaining U.S. security options in Asia. China fulfills
the role of minimizing Soviet military power as well as pro-
viding a possible security partner in the event of U.S. -
U.S.S.R. hostilities. In this role, she provides an alternative
source of support for the U.S. in the event of the collapse of the
existing U.S. defensive alliance system in Asia.
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The third international factor influencing the American
perception of interest is the domestic and foreign policies
of China itself. After the fall of the radical "Gang of Four"
in 1976, China has presented itself to the West as a more
rational nation attempting to modernize its economy in a
rational manner. The "Gang of Four" were four top party
officials who were intent on maintaining a more militant
line in internal and external affairs. Before their arrest,
it was unclear what path China would follow upon the death
of Mao in 1976. Their fall signaled the West that there was
a good possibility of a stable China.
China has embarked on a development plan designed to
achieve the "Four Modernizations" -- modernization of agri-
culture, industry, science and technology, and defense.
This is hardly the type of philosophy of Mao's "Great Leap"
of over twenty years ago. China's domestic policies reflect
an attempt "to build an economic system that combines central
planning with a market system." 1* 3 No doubt this "Yugoslavian"
approach is intuitively pleasing to any American capitalist.
China, now ostensibly conducting its economy based on prag-
matic principles, appears more acceptable and compatible to
the U.S. The .American perception may not be totally correct.
While it is true that the current regime espouses domestic
policies that conform more to our belief of what is good, it
is doubtful that China will abandon its long-range ideological
goals. On June 18, 1979, Chairman Hua emphasized the CCP's
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dedication to socialism in a speech delivered at the Second
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress.
Strengthening of our socialist democracy and
socialist legal system is urgently needed for the
sake of consolidating the socialist state system
which is led by the working class and has as its
masters the entire working people, for the sake of
solidifying the political foundation on which the
country can carry out socialist modernization in
stability and unity. ht*
There is a danger assuming there exists realism or idealism
exclusively rather than a mixture.
All of this means that while the United States may
welcome the triumph of pragmatism in China, this develop-
ment will not automatically resolve China's domestic
problems or clarify relations with the outside world.
"
5
Yet the fact remains that China has entered into a domestic
economic program that reflects more of rational management
than one based on ideological concerns. This pragmatic
approach perhaps reflects a more stable China and thus a
more reliable state to conduct relations with.
In addition to a more compatible economic policy, China
also is currently engaged in providing a more democratic
system for its population. This is not to be confused with
democracy in the Western sense. The regime has initiated
work on formulating a constitution which will possibly impact
favorably on the average citizen. This document may provide
a paper standard of laws that will provide a consistent
code for defining what is legal and what is not. This is
significant in that it allows the average citizen knowledge of
his rights rather than being judged by the whims of officials.
It is expected that this legal system will undergo difficulties
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in enforcement and standardization. Since the early days
of the P.R.C., the population has lived without this docu-
ment. A period of transition from old to new will most
likely witness instances of violation by officials who have
grown accustomed to their role as interpreters of the law.
The foreign policies of China have also altered to a
point that enabled a change in the U.S. perception of interest
As previously noted, the U.S. - P.R.C. normalization resulted
from both nations reassessing their respective bi-lateral
policies. Relations have improved steadily since the Nixon-
Kissinger trips, largely a result of the common perception
of the Soviet Union as the major world threat to peace.
China since then has tapered its foreign policy in an
appealing light. Stressing its support for the U.S.
presence in Asia (and Europe), the P.R.C. has in essence
reversed its previous anti-imperialism campaign aimed at the
U.S.
Several actions taken by China support this point.
Early in 1980, China allowed its thirty-year treaty with
Moscow to lapse, thus indicating diplomatically an official
split with the Soviet Union. Also, Chinese leaders have
officially indicated their support for the U.S. presence in
South Korea. This signal is representative of China's
appreciation of the role the United States plays in the




The compatibility of foreign policies can be described as
the pursuance of harmonious objectives in Asia and the world.
For China to achieve her new domestic goals, it is in her
best interest to enhance peace and stability through her
foreign policies. By indicating a pro-U.S. stance, China
has provided a favorable international environment that has
influenced the U.S. perception of interest in her.
The Sino- Japanese relationship must also be considered as
a factor influencing the U.S. interest in China. Not until
recently has there been a period of time when all three
nations (U.S. - P.R.C. - Japan) have enjoyed friendly rela-
tions with one another. Prior to, and throughout World
War II, the United States pursued policies aimed at insuring
the security of China from Japan. Not long after the war,
the relations of the U.S. with these two nations had
essentially reversed. This was a function of the Communist
victory in China in 1949 and the U.S. - Japan friendship
resulting from the occupation and reconstruction.
On September 8, 1951, the United States and Japan signed
a security treaty which gave the U.S. responsibility for
Japanese security. From this time until the early 1970's,
Japanese foreign policy toward China was congurous to that
of the U.S. China, seen as a direct threat to Japanese
security, influenced the government's position. Japan followed
U.S. leadership in relations with Taiwan.
Even though the "official" policy portrayed the P.R.C. as
a dangerous neighbor, Japan engaged in trade with her.
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Under the restrictions of COCOM (Coordinating Committee
for Export Controls to Communist Countries) , which the
Japanese have scrupulously followed, only a highly
selective list of "nonstrategic materials" could be
exported to China. ** 6
Table 2 illustrates the importance of this factor to both the
Japanese and Chinese economies. Japanese trade with the P.R.C.
had conveniently been explained by their principle of economic
and political separation.
Japan's reorientation of its relations with the P.R.C. can
be attributed to the initial U.S. - P.R.C. overtures in the
early 19 70 's. "...The international framework in which Japan
live(d) (had) been fundamentally altered (in) 1971 by... the
American opening to China. ... " k 7 These initial probes
conducted by the Nixon administration signaled Tokyo that the
P.R.C. was no longer regarded by Washington as a dangerous
enemy. Throughout the 1950 's and 1960 's, China had considered
any friend of the U.S. an enemy. "Once Peking and Washington
began to seek detente, however, Chinese policy changed nearly
overnight." 1* 8 Japan, witnessing the above phenomena of the
U.S. and P.R.C. initiating improved relations and no longer
itself being labeled an enemy by China, was stimulated to
normalize relations with the P.R.C. On September 29, 1972,
Japan officially recognized the People's Republic of China.
The Sino- Japanese rapprochement has influenced the American
perception of interest in China. A possible obstacle of Japan
protesting U.S. - P.R.C. normalization never materialized.
Before 1972, their own detente with China encouraged the
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provide an atmosphere of stability and cooperation in Asia
by three of the major powers there. After 1972, the Japanese
moved faster and farther in their good relations with China
due to the radical shift in U.S. policy.
A fifth external factor in shaping U.S. policy toward
China was the information on Communist supported insurgencies
In the late 1960 's and early 1970's, U.S. governmental policy
makers became more concerned about the nature of indigenous
insurgent movements throughout the world. It became apparent
to them that these movements were not as they had been por-
trayed in the past. Previously, it had been thought that
native Communist parties had received moral and material
support from a unified Communist block. Support for
insurgents was thought to be the one common interest between
the Soviet Union and the P.R.C. maintained after the Sino-
Soviet split in 1960.
In the U.S. Senate Hearings on U.S. Relations with the
P.R.C. in 1971, evidence which cast doubt on the above
assumption was presented by an array of witnesses. A similar
message ran through most testimonies. Experts and scholars
of China repeatedly stated that China is not motivated to
expand its influence, that native Communist parties are
motivated by internal conditions, and that Chinese support
of insurgents was a second priority to their desire to have
relationships with non-Communist governments .
*
9 The impact
of these ideas is that a new image of China was being por-
trayed. The idea that the U.S. was not fighting proxy forces
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in Vietnam but a nationalist movement on expelling a "colonial"
power gained notice. This helped assuage the customary
fears of a militant China fomenting anti-American sentiment
throughout Asia. The new perception of China's relations with
indigenous Communist parties was perceived as a much less
threat to American interests. This constituted a positive
factor enabling a more favorable perception of U.S. interest
in the P.R.C.
In addition to the primary international factors
influencing U.S. - P.R.C. policies, there are domestic factors
in the U.S. that influence the interest in the P.R.C. The
latter days of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam caused many
Americans to question the policies involving our role in Asia.
After the Tet offensive (1968) , a reappraisal was in order.
The Nixon Doctrine (1969) resulted in articulating a less
overt military posture in that region. The inevitable American
disengagement from Vietnam required that the Nixon administra-
tion accomplish something in Asia other than what some felt was
a defeat. Perhaps Nixon "was sufficiently flexible to profit
from the bitter aspects of the recent American experience in
Asia, particularly Vietnam, and to seek victories where he
had tasted defeats." 50 As a result, after the announcement of
the Nixon Doctrine, he took steps in 1971 and 1972 to lessen
tensions with both the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. in the name of
detente. The SALT negotiations and the U.S. - U.S.S.R.
improved relations were not well received in Peking. It
appeared to the Chinese leadership that the U.S. security
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withdrawal in Asia had left a vacuum to be filled by the
Soviet Union. In April, 1975, Saigon fell to the North
Vietnamese armies. This phenomenon caused a reappraisal of
the U.S. role in Asia. President Ford's response, the
Pacific Doctrine, was not novel. Its value was its emphasis
on continued normalization of relations with the P.R.C. and
a pledge to respect sovereignty and peaceful co-existence.
It also signaled a renewed interest in Asia.
Today the domestic political climate is not preoccupied
with Vietnam or its aftermath. The primary issue regarding
Asia appears to be our role with China interfaced with the
perceived Soviet involvement there. The debate of how to
employ U.S. assets to deter Soviet activities in Asia is a
current sub-issue in policy formation. The advocation of
using China as a lever to manipulate Soviet policies has
gained considerable notice in Washington. While initially
professing an "evenhanded" approach to the Soviet Union and
China, the current administration has come under pressure
to tilt more toward Peking than Moscow.
There also appears to be an economic factor influencing
the U.S. perception of interest in China. With repeated
OPEC oil price hikes, growing dependence on sources from the
unstable Persian Gulf, China is seen as a possible source
alleviating the energy quandary. In addition, domestic
corporations have built high hopes of penetrating China with
their goods. A more tangible result in the "China market"
has been in purchases of American grain to help feed their
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burgeoning population. With the habitual U.S. grain surplus
and the difficulties in improving the grain/population ratio
in China, there apepars to be a real and lasting market there
for some time to come. Attention is drawn to economic factors
because of their obvious connection with the security interest
The primary domestic factors influending the U.S. percep-
tion of interest are: the general desire on the part of one
segment of the American public to compensate for the lessened
American role in Asia, the perception of Soviet growth and
influence, and economic opportunities.
A recent development on the issue of U.S. - P.R.C.
relations is the Reagan platform in his candidacy for
President. While a candidate, he has indicated that, if
elected, he would strengthen relations with Taiwan. This
was viewed by the Chinese as a policy proposal
...completely destroying the principle underlying the
normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, and relations
between the two countries would retreat to a position
the people of neither country would like to see. 51
The dilemma facing Reagan was exactly that which faced
Carter: how to build an expanding favorable policy with the
P.R.C. while retaining good relations with Taiwan, considered
by China as an outlying province. It was obvious that
Governor Reagan's Taiwan comments were designed to solidify
support from the right-wing Republican faction prior to the
election but he was entirely aware of the necessity of continu
ing the normalization process ianugurated by President Nixon
and carried forward by President Ford. He sent to China
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his running mate, George Bush, with advisors Allen and
Laird, to help him in any way possible to solve his dilemma.
It was also expected that this trip would persuade the
Chinese that Reagan, in spite of his well-known views, would
act in a statesmanlike manner if he were elected.
The fact is undeniable that the U.S. has a national
interest in the P.R.C. and has a significant role to play
in Asia. This fact is unrelated to partisanship and permits
partisan differences only as to methods by which agreed-
upon objectives are to be achieved.
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III. RECENT U.S. POLICIES RELATIVE TO THE P.R.C.
In the past two years, there has been substantial evidence
indicating an enhanced U.S. interest in China. This evidence
has appeared in tangible as well as in rhetorical forms.
Despite previous mentioning, it is appropriate to list the
significant developments involving the U.S. and P.R.C.
1 Jan 1979: U.S. grants full diplomatic relations to the
P.R.C.
Aug 1979: Secretary of State Vance signs legal documents
certifying China as a "friendly" state.
(Yugoslavia is only other communist state
having this status.)
27 Aug 1979: Vice-President Mondale makes address broadcast
nationwide at Beijing (Peking) University.
States that China and the United States share
parallel strategic and bilateral interests.
5-13 Jan 1980: Secretary of Defense Brown visits China for
defense related discussions; public statements
issued. 52
24 Jan 1980: U.S. grants most favored nation trading status
to the P.R.C. (The U.S.S.R. desires but has
been denied this status.)
25 - 29 May 1980: Vice-Premier Geng Biao visits the U.S.
for military equipment sales talks. U.S.
states that it will sell the P.R.C. dual-use
items: transport aircraft, defense radar, and
helicopters
.
4 Jun 1980: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke makes
speech entitled "China and the U.S.: Into
the 1980's." It is important in emphasizing
that the triangular diplomacy between the
U.S. - U.S.S.R. - P.R.C. is no longer an
adequate conceptual tool for conducting
relations. (See Appendix A.)
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The above events, in a relatively short period of time,
show that the U.S. not only perceives but is pursuing good
relations with China as a basic national interest.
In August, 1979, Vice-President Mondale delivered a
speech in the P.R.C. at Beijing (Peking) University. It
is significant in that it was the first speech by an
.American broadcast nationwide in the P.R.C. Mondale
stressed the U.S. security interest in China by saying:
Thus any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate
you in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American
interests. This is why the United States normalized rela-
tions with your country, and that is why we must work to
broaden and strengthen our new friendship. 53
As an example of the rapidity with which circumstances
change, Carter informed Brezhnev in January, 1979, "that the
United States has no plans to sell arms to China." 51* One year
later, immediately following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
Secretary Brown
...informed the Chinese that the United States was now
ready to move "from passive to more active forms of
security cooperation" with Peking, and that this would
include "complementary" and "parallel" actions "in the
field of defense as well as diplomacy." 55
Four months later, "the administration offered to sell trans-
port aircraft and helicopters, which could have military uses,
to Peking." 56 This may not be in conflict to Carter's previous
message to the Soviet leader; it signifies the Administration's
willingness to interpret its position liberally. In May, 1980,
Vice-Premier Geng Biao visited the U.S. to study military
purchases. The result was that, in addition to approval of ex-
porting transport aircraft and helicopters., the Administration
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"approve (d) export licenses permitting American companies
to ship advanced military equipment to China, including
computers and air defense radar." 57
Other than military related sales, diplomatic recognition,
and granting of MFN trade status, political rhetoric has indi-
cated an increased interest in China by the U.S. Prior to the
Afghanistan invasion, the official U.S. policy was one of
exercising "evenhandedness" in relations with the P.R.C. and
U.S.S.R. Normalization was justified by President Carter
as a tack that
...would help move global politics away from a system
dominated by two military giants, the United States and
the Soviet Union, toward an international order composed
of several major powers, including China. 58
In May, 1980, a U.S. official stated, in reference to the
military equipment sales, "the Russians have to realize that
what we have done thus far with China is a very small part,
a very small fraction of what we could do." 59
In addition to rhetoric, the U.S. has announced recently
a change in strategic plans which indicates increased mili-
tary requirements in Asia.
President Carter agreed last month (April) to a new
strategic plan that no longer commits Washington to
send Pacific-based forces to Europe in the event of
Soviet attack there, according to Government officials. 60
This is seen as a response in planning to the increased
viability of Soviet Far East military forces. The abandonment
of the "swing strategy," as the idea of reinforcing NATO with
Pacific-based forces is called, results from the need of
increased American naval presence in the Indian Ocean
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as a response to the increased viability of the Soviet
Far East military forces.
In June, 1980, Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Holbrooke addressed the National Council for U.S. - China
Trade. His speech has since been published by the State's
Bureau of Public Affairs as Current Policy No. 187. It is
significant in that it stresses the importance of a stable
China to the United States. The principles outlined in the
speech that apply to U.S. policy toward China are:
1. The U.S. will develop relations with China on their
own merits. Relations will not be a function of
relations with the Soviet Union.
2. Relations with China will not be pursued at the
expense of relations with other states.
3. Policies will reflect the U.S. interest in a
friendly and successfully modernizing China.
4. The U.S. will pursue the interest of a strong,
secure China. The existing international environ-
ment does not justify arms sales nor joint military
planning. The U.S. will assist China's security
improvements by permitting appropriate technology
transfers
.
5. The U.S. will adhere to normalization understandings
with respect to Taiwan. The relations between Taiwan
and the P.R.C. are for the two parties to settle.
6. The U.S. will pursue policies engaging Chinese involve
ment in solving global problems.
The Chinese have also provided rhetoric, usually in the
form of soliciting increased U.S. interest in China. The
methods employed have usually been in the form of warning of
Soviet expansionism. An example of an official Chinese




All countries in the world should unite and deal
seriously with the Soviet policy of global expansion-
ism. China and the U.S. should do something in a
down-to-earth way so as to defend world peace
against Soviet hegemonism. 5
l
As noted above, there have been numerous indicators, in
relations, military sales, strategic plans, and rhetoric,
that highlight the fact that the U.S. perceives it has a
greater interest in China than before. No longer is our
interest served by China becoming less antagonistic and thus
friendly to the United States. The tangible indicators are
in essence the plans and policies that have been incorporated
so as to achieve certain goals and objectives. Ultimately,
accomplishing the above will secure a trajectory that insures
the best probability for securing the American interests
in China. At this point, the work has discussed events and
issues that have already occurred. The purpose is to pro-
vide a reasonable interpretation of the present.
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IV. COMPONENTS OF CHINA'S SECURITY
PROBLEMS AND CAPABILITIES
In the following discussion, an attempt will be made to
identify the components of China's security objectives and
capabilities, particularly the geographic and military com-
ponents. These components, when synthesized with the U.S.
goals and objectives, will permit an analysis to be made of
the U.S. security interest in China. In reviewing the actual
policies incorporated in light of the above, we will be able
to determine whether the U.S. has enacted rational plans so
as to secure its interest. This will make it feasible to
define more clearly the parameters within which future
policies will be adjudged.
A. GEOGRAPHICAL COMPONENTS
1 . Sino-Soviet Border
Perhaps the most significant geographical component
of China's security capability is its immense border of over
4,500 miles with the Soviet Union. China presently perceives
its primary security threat from these border areas. Aside
from the U.S.S.R., no nation sharing borders with the P.R.C.
possesses the capability or military posture indicating
offensive tendencies. China's present security quandary to
the north and the past border skirmishes there are not new
phenomena. Historically the Chinese have experienced major
invasions from generally the same area that it now perceives
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a threat. The Mongols and Manchus both invaded and
conquered China in the 13th and 17th centuries, respectively.
The historical precedent, in a nation ultimately aware of its
heritage, cannot be understated. In security matters,
China's chief concern is, as in the past, from a threat of
invasion from the north.
China also shares western borders in Sinkiang province
with the Soviet Union. This area is inhabited both in the
U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. by Turkish minorities. China's
concern is that this minority population can be exploited
by Soviet propaganda designed to stir unrest and thus foment
anti-government feelings.
The January, 1980, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
adds a further security concern to the P.R.C. From this
region, it is possible to traverse the Aksai Chin to gain
entry on an additional axis of advance into China.
2. Sea Lane Security
In addition to China's historical border threats,
a new dimension has been added. With the quantitative and
qualitative improvements in the Soviet Naval forces in the
East Asia area, China, as well as Asia, faces uncertainty in
maintenance of sea lanes in conflict situations. This situa-
tion must be considered in the overall context of American
security interests in China. In a worst-case scenario, a
world war, it is possible that the Russian fleet could insulate
all of Asia from an American naval force. China's central
location emphasizes its vulnerability from not only its
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northern frontier, but from a Soviet sterilized maritime
environment as well. It must be emphasized that the
apocalyptic consequences of Soviet naval invincibility may
be less than probable but are at least possible.
3. Other Neighbors
In terms of security, it is important to discuss
those neighboring states, other than the U.S.S.R, that
present a threat to the P.R.C. As stated previously, only
the U.S.S.R. possesses the capability to constitute a
real threat in terms of invasion. However, the actions
of other states in collusion with the U.S.S.R. can be con-
sidered in a discussion of security problems. Today there
are three neighbors of China that the Soviet Union exercises
significant influence over: India, Vietnam, and North Korea.
These three nations represent different security aspects
for China and thus will be discussed separately.
India and China have not enjoyed consistent amiable
relations, largely a result of border clashes. The major
military confrontations occurred in 1962. The dispute had
earlier origins, but it came into the open as early as 1959.
The Soviet aspect is that in this year, they adopted a neutral
stance regarding the territorial claims between China and
India. When the border war erupted in 1962, the Soviets
clearly supported India "through continued delivery of war
material to New Delhi despite the Chinese - Indian clashes." 62
In 1971, the U.S.S.R. signed a treaty with and also supported
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India in its war with China's friend, Pakistan. The security
aspect is that while India might not possess the military
apparatus to pose a unilateral threat, its tilt toward Moscow
represents its inclination. This added dimension signifies
that India, on issues concerning China, will more than likely
side with the Soviet Union. Also, in the scenario of a world
conflict, India must be considered as a potential second
front threat to China.
Vietnam has had no love historically for China. It
has experienced numerous military invasions from China through-
out the centuries. The Chinese regard this area as an extension
of Sinic civilization and consider that, if outside influence
is to be injected, it should be theirs. Influence by Moscow,
in such close proximity, is clearly regarded as a threatening
component of an encircling strategy. Events which emphasize
this security threat are
:
- Vietnam's admittance into COMECON (June 1978),
- The Hanoi - Moscow Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation (November 1978) , and
- Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia)
(December 1978) .
China's anxiety over the above developments, exacerbated by
Hanoi's discrimination on ethnic Chinese, precipitated the
February, 1979, punitive expedition into Vietnam. Even
though the attack was limited in terms of objectives, China
sustained significant casualty figures which suggests that the
expedition may not have accomplished its strategic objective.
The Vietnamese are still close to Moscow, still have forces in
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Kampuchea, and are still discriminating against their
ethnic Chinese population
The Soviet Union has turned out to be the sole winner
in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Moscow has gained a
valuable ally on the southern flank of China. 63
The tangible aspects of Moscow's gains are that not only does
it support a neighboring state that constitutes a viable
threat to China; its predictable expanding use of Cam Ranh
Bay will substantially increase the effectiveness of its
naval arm. This would greatly enhance its prowess due to the
alleviation of many of the logistic problems incurred in
supporting a fleet from Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The
naval aspect has greater implications than just one of Sino-
Soviet hostility. The use of Vietnam as a Soviet naval
facility has a vast impact on regional security as well. The
already discussed scenario of a well equipped Russian navy
insulating Asia from the U.S. is made more realistic by the
use of Vietnam's port facilities. In a sense, Vietnam consti
tutes a Soviet threat on another front, verifying China's
perception of Soviet motives.
North Korea represents a neighbor of both China and
the Soviet Union. There is an element of uncertainty in the
triangular relationship of these three countries in that both
China and the U.S.S.R. compete for influence there. The
Chinese perspective historically is that the Korean peninsula
traditionally has been a route of entry into China and as an
objective of invasion from China.
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Korea represents as much a security issue for China
as ever. It is widely known that Kim II sung, the North
Korean leader, has vowed to unify Korea through military
means. Even though both China and the Soviet Union oppose
any large-scale conflict there, and seek to restrain North
Korea, it can be argued that Kim might try to exploit the
Sino-Soviet dispute to his advantage. From a Chinese view-
point, if the U.S.S.R. chose to sanction a North Korean
invasion, China would be in a precarious situation. Several
questions arise from this scenario. Would China support
North Korea as a fellow Communist nation and thus uphold its
treaty obligation? Or would it remain outside the conflict
so as to maintain its newly established ties with the West?
Clearly the P.R.C. has a dilemma. It supports reunification
by other than violent means, which at the present does not
seem likely. Given the P.R.C. f s present program of moderniza-
tion, it is doubtful that Peking will do anything to upset
the status quo. China wants above all peace and stability
in the region. Given the present situation in North Korea,
exacerbated by the South's political turbulence, it is in order
to suggest that Peking will attempt to increase its influence,
vis-a-vis Mowcow, over Pyongyang. This will enable her not
only to sustain its position vis-a-vis Russia, but also to
provide a restraint on Kim II sung.
4. Agrarian Fragility
When considering geographical components in respect
to China, one must not overlook the enormous role of agriculture
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in Chinese life. Since this work deals with security, it is
appropriate to discuss how China's agricultural system reflects
on that issue.
Agriculture is the first priority in China's Four
Modernizations scheme. It is important to note that 701 of
the population, of roughly one billion, is engaged in agri-
cultural pursuit where only 10% of the land is arable. This
highlights the magnitude of agriculture in the Chinese life
and economy. It is of utmost importance for the present
Chinese leaders not to be a part of any policy that aids in
disruption of the already strained food production system.
The production of the staple crop, grain, has barely
kept pace with the population growth since 1949. Since this
date, production has tripled from 111 million metric tons
to 312 million metric tons. With population increasing in
the same period from 538 million to almost one billion, the
grain/population ratio has generally remained just under
300 kilograms per capita. The experience in the years 1959-61,
when crop failures resulted in an average of 236 kilograms per
capita, is a vivid memory in China. This period shows the
fragility of the agricultural system. A reduction of 201
in grain production resulted in widespread famine. In the
best years China maintains a subsistence level of grain
production.
China's leaders state that
...we must maintain the political stability and unity
for a long time to come. Unless we meet this pre-
requisite, the realization of the Four Modernizations,
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including agricultural modernization, before the end
of this century will be out of the question. 6 **
The normalization of relations with the West and Japan may
have initially been a reaction to the growing Soviet threat.
China is also reaping the rewards of trade with these nations
by applying the benefits to modernization of the agricultural
sector. Only the West can provide grain in the event of a
climatic catastrophe in China. For the current regime,
stability and security are the prerequisites to reaching the
long-range goals. Any disruption of any magnitude could
affect the present leaders' credibility and thus provide
impetus to the now-dormant pro-Moscow cliques. The present
regime in no way wants to return to the chaotic days of the
Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution. In a situation
such as those, China would be vulnerable from external as well
as internal sources.
China needs to enhance its relations with the West
and Japan so as to develop substantial agricultural schemes
incorporating efficient and mechanized farms. In respect
to China's emphasis on stability and agricultural moderniza-
tion, it is expected that the Chinese government will con-
tinue its current pragmatic policy.
B. MILITARY COMPONENTS
China's military apparatus is primarily a defensive-
oriented ground conventional force. The People's Liberation
Army (PLA) encompasses the air and naval arms as well as the
ground combat units. In terms of manpower, she possesses
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the largest defense establishment in the world with 4.36
million personnel on active dutyf 5 For comparative purposes,
Table 3 sets forth relevant data on U.S., P.R.C., U.S.S.R.,
N.A.T.O (without U.S.), and Warsaw Pact (without U.S.S.R.)
military establishments. All figures which follow are
derived from The Military Balance, 1979-80
,
published by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
To describe the PLA, it is best to do so in terms of
personnel, equipment, and support activities. Within each
area, different aspects, such as quantity and quality, will
be discussed.
- Conventional Forces
As stated above, the P.R.C. has the largest military force
in the world. The PLA is divided into the ground, naval, and
air arm. The quantity of personnel in each arm is shown in
Table 4. Table 5 shows the structure of the P.R.C. Armed
Forces (Army)
.
The deployment of these forces is divided into eleven
Military Regions (MR) which are further divided into Military
Districts (MD)
.
1. North and Northeast China (Shenyang and Peking MR):
52 MF DIVs, 29 LF DIVs.
2. North and Northwest China (Lanzhou and Xinjiang
MR): 13 MF DIVs, 12 LF DIVs.
3. East and Southeast China (Jinan, Nanjing, Fuzhou,
and Guangzhou MR): 32 MF DIVs, 26 LF DIVs.
4. Central China (Wuhan MR): 14 MF DIVs (incl 3 ABN




1. MANPOWER (in thousands) - in ARMED FORCES
U.S. U.S.S.R. P.R.C. N.A.T.O




2. FORCES AS % OF MEN 18 - 45 YRS
.
Warsaw
U.S. U.S.S.R. P.R.C. N.A.T.O. Pact
4.5 6.6 2.1 4.13 4.95
3. MILITARY EXPENDITURE - % of GNP
U.S. U.S.S.R. P.R.C. N.A.T.O







ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE
1. Number
(thousands) 3,600 360 400
2. Percentage 82.5 8.25 9.25
ARMY
TABLE 5
MAIN FORCES (MF) LOCAL FORCES (LF)
115 Infantry Divisions 85 Divisions
11 Armor Divisions 130 Independent Regiments
5 Airborne Divisions
40 Artillery Divisions










? Southwes t China (Chengdu and Kunming MR):18 MF DIVs, 11 LF DIVs.
In terms of quality, the PLA soldier is regarded as a
tough, disciplined fighting man. Given the Maoist philosophy
of a "People's War," the PLA is capable of engaging most
effectively in small unit operations. The most serious
personnel shortfall in modernization is seen to be the
peasant-soldiers' inability to operate the more sophisticated
weapons systems. Table 6 lists the major equipment quantities
of the ground forces in the PLA.
TABLE 6
11,000 TANKS
1,500 - - - - ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
16,000 --------- - ARTILLERY PIECES
32,000 MORTARS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS,
ANTI-TANK GUNS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT
GUNS
All of the above equipment is ten to twenty years out of
date. Almost all tanks are of the Soviet model T-34 and T-54
which the Chinese have termed the T- 34/85 and Type 59,
respectively. The Type 62 tank is a Chinese-produced
light tank used primarily for reconnaissance and where roads,
bridges, and terrain are unsuitable for heavier vehicles.
The Type 63 is a Chinese-produced amphibious tank copied from
the Soviet PT-76 reconnaissance vehicle. It has been fitted
with a larger gun and is used in similar roles as the Type 62.
71

Even though an adequate armored vehicle, the Chinese tank
lacks the technological improvements that have been implemented
on NATO and Warsaw Pact main battle tanks. There is a signifi-
cant lack of such technical innovation as laser rangef inders
,
thermal imagery, and automatic loaders. To improve the PLA's
effectiveness against the threat of a Soviet invasion, the
number of tanks per Infantry Division increased (starting in
1969) from thirty to eighty.
The status of the artillery is similar to that of the
armor. The standard howitzers in use are copies of Soviet
models. While all of the pieces (57mm - 152 mm) are effective
weapons, they have not been widely incorporated with modern
technological innovations as computerized fire direction
centers. The Chinese have recently developed a self-propelled
artillery piece by outfitting a 122mm howitzer in a tracked
vehicle resembling the indigenously designed and produced
M-1967 armored personnel carrier. An (SP) artillery vehicle
represents an indirect fire weapon that has the speed and
mobility of a mechanized unit. The mechanization of an armed
force is indicative of contemporary modernization efforts
thoughout the world.
As for rocket launchers, anti-tank guns, and anti-aircraft
guns, the PLA has also yet to incorporate those newest weapons
that have appeared in NATO and Warsaw Pact. China possesses




The support activities of China's ground forces reflect
the defense posture of the PLA. She "lacks facilities and
logistic support for protracted large-scale operations outside






- North Sea Fleet: Yalu River to south of Lianyungang
- East Sea Fleet: Lianyungang to Dongshan
- South Sea Fleet: Dongshan to Vietnamese frontier
Ships
:
1 - - - - 'HAN' SSN (nuc. pwr.) submarine
1 . _ . _ 'GOLF' class submarine
91 ... . Submarines (incl. 68 'ROMEOs', 21 'WHISKY,'
2 'MING' class)
4 ... . GORDY Destroyers (ex-Soviet, w/STYX SSM)
7 - - - - LUTA Destroyers (w/STYX SSM)
14 ... . Frigates (w/STYX SSM or SAMs)
9 - - - - Patrol Escorts
120 - - - - Hydrofoil Patrol Craft
20 - - - - Large Patrol Craft (KRONSTADT)
The Naval Arm also incorporates its own air arm of about






150 - - - - IL-28/B-5 (torpedo) and Tu-16/Tu-2 (light
bombers)
575 - - - - Fighters (Mig-17/F-4, Mig-19/F-6, and F-9)
50 - - - - Helicopters (Mi-4/H-5)
The Chinese Navy operates, as does the ground force, without
the most modern equipment. Compared with the recent past,
China's naval capability is steadily increasing through
modernization and growth. "Efforts are geared to the
building of a coastal defense navy." 6 To emphasize the
Chinese Navy's growth, she possessed 49 submarines in 1974
which is compared with 91 of the same type she has today.
In terms of capability, the naval forces are seen as an
adequate force for coastal defense operations. She, at this
moment, does not possess the capability to interdict sea lanes,
conduct amphibious operations for more than 30,000 men, or
operate for long durations without porting. These are the
capabilities describing a "blue-water" navy.
Table 9 shows the equipment in the PLA Air Force. The
significance of the equipment inventory given in this table
is similar to that of the other two arms. While quite large,
the Chinese Air Force possesses the qualitative equipment of
that of the Korean War vintage. There is no long-range bomber








80 - 90 - - - - Tu-16/B-6 BADGER bombers
300 - - - - I1-28/B-5 BEAGLE bombers (light)
100 - - - - Tu-2 BAT bombers (light)
500 - - - - Mig-15/F-2, F-9 fighters
3,700 - - - - Mig-17/F-4, F-5 $ Mig-19/F-6 fighters
80 - - - - Mig-21/F-8, F-9 fighters
500 - - - - Transports (300 An-2/C-5, 100 Li-2,
50 11-14/18, and some An-12/24/26, 18 TRIDENTS)
350 - - - - Helicopters (Mi-4/H-5, Mi-8, and 13
SUPER FRLON
500 - - - - Aircraft available from civil aviation
fleet
The 80 to 90 Tu-16's comprise the Chinese long-range bomber
fleet.
The nuclear missile capability of the P.R.C. has been
compared with that of France. However, with the May 18, 1980,
testing of the CSSX-4 ICBM, capable of delivering at least
a 3MT warhead, the P.R.C. can no longer be put in that category
The
...successful firing has important strategic implications
for China's defense against the Soviet Union... based on
the test (the missile) could reach most of the Soviet
Union, and possibly the western United States. 68
Before this development, China could only reach eastern parts
of the U.S.S.R. with the CSSX-3 and the Tu-16 bomber with















































































































of the new missiles. The capability, demonstrated to the
world, signifies China's growing deterrence capability.
The nuclear missile force of China has significant
shortcomings other than limited quantity when compared to the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. As of 1979, all missiles used liquid pro-
pellant. This characteristic represents a vulnerability in
that there is a costly time factor required to fuel the missiles
prior to launching. From normal readiness configurations,
the missiles require several hours to fuel for the older
CSS-1 and CSS- 2 to a little less than an hour for the newer
CSSX-3 and CSSC-4. Thus, were the Chinese nuclear force under
attack, it is doubtful all of the missiles could be fueled in
time to avoid destruction. It should be added that "China
has one 'GOLF' -class submarine with missile launching tubes,
but it does not appear to have missiles for it." 69
By way of summary, this work has concentrated on empha-
sizing the relative defensive nature of China's military
establishment. She relies primarily on quantity rather than
quality. This is not to say that China's leaders are satis-
fied with this arrangement. In ever-increasing frequency
there have been reports of Peking's desire to purchase Western
military hardware. Angus Fraser, in an article entitled
"Military Modernization in China" in Problems of Communism ,
employed a unique approach to analyzing Peking's military
modernization goals. He recorded the frequency of Chinese
officials* expressions of interest in weapons, equipment, and
technology. From viewing the capabilities of the items
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referred to, he concluded that "more than half of the items
look directly to defense against an invader." 70 Perhaps this
indicates Peking's military objectives. Then again, the
interest in defense technology may be a logical choice. It
seems plausible that China will not ask for offensive items
that would stand the chance of not being sold to them.
One cannot blame the Chinese leaders for seeking military
modernization. The costs of making the PLA into an equipped
force comparable to that of the U.S.S.R. are beyond the reach
of the already shaky Chinese economy. Her best hope is to
maintain a plan of development that will pose a significant
enough force to provide a credible deterrent, conventional and
nuclear. "Nevertheless, China must face the cruel truth that




This work has discussed the events and issues that have
spurred the normalization of U.S. - P.R.C. relations. The two
countries have experienced a rather rapid movement from cold to
warm. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to evaluate
the current policies designed to protect the U.S. security
interest in China. Considerations will be made regarding
whether further security arrangements are necessary or
advisable
.
Several ideas warrant preliminary discussion. First,
possible negative future developments must be postulated to
serve as a "governor" on policy formulation. Second, analysis
of the "China Card" strategy is pertinent in identifying and
evaluating existing schools of thought. Third, the U.S.
objectives in China's future international role must be
identified. On the basis of these considerations, current
security policies can be evaluated.
The security interest in China stems from her status of no
longer being considered an adversary. With normalization, the
doctrine and readiness of the U.S. military forces has been
simplified by China no longer considered a threat to the U.S.
or its allies. China, in shifting from adversary to friend,
acts in a role compatible to U.S. interests by posing as a
counterweight to the Soviet security threat in Asia.
In considering that China may continue to be considered
as no threat contrary to U.S. interests in Asia, it is assumed
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that the current regime there will not be replaced by a more
radical segment. Recent developments in Chinese politics
seem to indicate continued viability of the pro-U.S.,
pragmatist faction. Zhao Ziyang's succession to Premier is
evidence of firm control of political influence by Deng
Xiaoping, who champions pragmatic policies of the Four
Modernizations and maintenance of friendly relations with the
United States.
Despite recent successes in incorporation of labor incen-
tives and wage increases, the prospect of economic failure
of stagnation could produce internal opposition to the
current regime. There are a significant number of party and
government officials who came to prominence during the
Cultural Revolution. This group has been thought to be more
ideologically oriented and concerned than pragmatic. A
catastrophic event, of which China is well experienced in,
that acts detrimentally on the economy, could challenge the
legitimacy of the present regime. If conditions deteriorated
to a significant degree, the contemporaries of the "Gang of
Four," who are now lying low, could emerge as a contending
force on the ranks of the leadership. In an ideological
battle, the evils of the moderates would certainly be asso-
ciated with the "imperialist" ambitions of the United States.
In furthering this scenario, a victory and subsequent purge
of the moderates by the radicals would probably destroy the
present status of U.S. - P.R.C. relations. It is feasible
that the U.S. would be returned to be regarded as the number
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one enemy of the people by the new regime. This worst-case
scenario must be considered by policy makers as a possibility
and thus must be used as a guide or parameter in policy
formulation.
The intentions of the present Chinese regime must also
be viewed in respect to China's new role as a U.S. friend.
"American policy makers seem to believe that 'technology 1
can break down political restraints and that 'modernization'
will make everyone like us." 72 It must not be forgotten that
the tenets of Communist ideology espouse the violent over-
throw of our type of system. It can be speculated that, if
China succeeds in its pursuit of modernization goals, they may
be less apt to view the U.S. as a much needed friend. The
post-World War II recovery of Japan and Western Europe pro-
vide an example of this phenomenon. Their policies today no
longer are as America-oriented as was the case in the 1950 's.
China's development could be analogous if she gains the economic
stature of these examples. In contrast, China's Communist
ideology may regain its prominence as a compass for foreign
policy formulation once goals dependent on the U.S. relation-
ship are realized.
The American security interest in China is also derived
from China's role in Asia. When viewed as a stabilizing force,
the P.R.C. complements U.S. aspirations in Asia. China cur-
rently is pursuing policies of regional cooperation and self-
determination. This contrasts with her past activity of
supporting national liberation movements by exporting military
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equipment and expertise. On the surface, the muting of these
activities appears favorably when compared to the past.
This change has serious connotations. China has no substitute
for its past support of insurgent parties. The absence of
this lever results in a vacuum that is willingly filled
by a new donor -- the Soviet Union. Thus China's favorable
role in fostering Asian stability has not eliminated the
problem. It is doubtful that the P.R.C. is willing to donate
its influence over the native Communist parties to the U.S.S.R,
The vulnerability exists that this might occur if Moscow is
able to successfully exploit Peking's current policy.
China's economic turn to the West could also have negative
effects on the U.S. role in Asia. As Japan, Western Europe,
and the U.S. increasingly invest development capital in China,
other Asian nations may possibly be neglected or receive less
than they would have before. For stability, all concerned
have an interest in seeing that there is continued develop-
ment in South Korea, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and Taiwan. Thus, China's stability of her neighbors
may be directly associated with the role she plays in the
international trade and economic community.
The "China Card" strategy must be evaluated to determine
its validity in protecting the U.S. security interest in
China. This is
...a policy concept which can broadly be defined as
one of strengthening United States - People's
Republic of China (PRC) relations as a means of
influencing Soviet policy and the development of
United States - Soviet relations. 78
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From this concept, the debate has resulted in three schools
of thought, all concerning the impact of the "China Card" on
the U.S.S.R. The schools and their positions are:
1. LOW- IMPACT: the point of view in this group
is that U.S. relations with China are not going
to affect the U.S.S.R. or the U.S. - U.S.S.R.
bi-lateral relations.
2. MANIPULATIVE: this perspective is based on the
premise that U.S. - P.R.C. relations do, in fact,
affect the U.S.S.R. They do also think that this
should be used to manipulate the U.S.S.R.
3. NON-MANIPULATIVE: this group also thinks that
U.S. - P.R.C. relations affect the U.S.S.R.
They differ in that they oppose any use of
this fact as a lever to manipulate Soviet
policies
.
If one accepts the premise of Soviet intentions to gain
influence throughout the world, the validity of the LOW-
IMPACT philosophy comes under question. The Soviets, con-
fronted with major adversaries in Europe and now Asia, certainly
feel that a P.R.C. - U.S. - Japan - Western Europe consortium
would not be in their best security interests. A China, made
increasingly secure by Western arms and technology, signifies
an increasingly credible threat to the U.S.S.R. One can
wonder why the Soviet Union feels compelled to station over
45 divisions on the Chinese border if they are not concerned
about U.S. - P.R.C. relations. There is little validity to
the LOW- IMPACT school of thought.
In evaluating the MANIPULATIVE and NON -MANIPULATIVE
perspective, it appears that both recognize the impact of
U.S. - P.R.C. relations on the Soviet Union. One advocates an
activist policy while the other advocates a less involved line.
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Perhaps this divergence lies in the proponents' interpretation
of the Soviet intentions. The activists' support of "tooling-
up" China as a means of insuring the balance of power may pro-
voke irrational Soviet behavior and thus be destabilizing.
The NON-iMANIPULATIVE school recognizes this aspect and it is
for this reason it opposes using China as a lever.
Neither of these two schools tells the whole story.
Policies designed to protect the U.S. security interest in
China should not be formulated primarily for their effect on
the Soviet Union. Policies should, however, be considered
with their possible effects on the U.S.S.R. in mind. If there
is any burden to be carried, U.S. leaders can place it on the
Soviets by adoption of further security policies as a result
of Soviet provocation. Knowing that, if they pursue policies
irritating to the U.S., they risk further driving the P.R.C.
and U.S. into each other's arms.
To evaluate and propose policies regarding China, U.S.
policy makers must be cognizant of the objectives hoped to
be achieved. A secure and stable China is seen as in the
interest of the United States. Efforts which contribute to
China's ability to defend herself appear to promote interna-
tional peace and stability. An expanding Chinese role in the
international community of nations also appears to insure a
stable and developing China as a result of her increased
investment in the system in which she operates. These appear
to be the basic two objectives that all U.S. policy should
be designed to achieve.
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There exists no formal, written policy concerning U.S. -
P.R.C. security ties. U.S. policies designed to bolster China's
defense have been sales of military/civilian equipment. Also,
President Carter has indicated that the current administration
will make no attempt to limit or protest sales of military
weapons and equipment to China from other nations. Any further
U.S. action involving defense cooperation with China is not
appropriate now. Sales of U.S. hardware, joint exercises,
alliance- type agreements would appear to be designed specifi-
cally for countering Soviet power and influence. This, in
itself, is not necessarily undesirable. But using China
deliberately as a means of opposing the Soviet Union appears
provocative and destabilizing. Policies enacted so far have
resulted in no immediate Soviet reaction while at the same time
have fostered closer relations with the Chinese. The above
policies have acted in a positive manner regarding the U.S.
security interest. The continued regime stability and
pro-U.S. stance in the P.R.C. indicate that the positive
trajectory has been maintained.
Any further considerations regarding further security
arrangements with the P.R.C. must proceed on a careful course
between the two Communist giants. Caution should be heeded
to avoid rushing into a short-term solution to the overwhelming
Soviet threat. Policy makers must recognize the possibility in
getting caught up in the momentum of U.S. - P.R.C. relations.
Each favorable China policy might not seem so significant when
considered in a vacuum. But when viewed in its relationship
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on the P.R.C. - U.S. normalization trajectory, each new policy
can be assessed as an incremental shift within the larger
context. Also policies enacted must be considered from a
long-range point of view.
It is difficult to envision a U.S. administration back-
peddling in this relationship without inflicting enormous
implications on Peking. In conclusion, the writer would agree
with Secretary Holbrooke in that U.S. policies with China need
not be evenhanded as to the Soviet Union. On the other hand,
the U.S. should maintain a posture that allows good relations
with both the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. The present U.S. - P.R.C.
moves should be adequate to influence the U.S.S.R. to seek to
improve U.S. - U.S.S.R. relations. No further actions by the
U.S. in regard to its security interest in China are necessary
at the moment. Soviet behavior should determine if further
U.S. - P.R.C. ties are made. If this tack works, a Soviet







China and the U.S
Into the 1980s
June 4, 1980
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Following is an address by Richard Holbrooke, Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the
National Council for U.S. - China Trade on June 4, 1980.
Less than a decade ago, after 20 years of doubt, hesita-
tion, and often savage debate in this country, we began to
move toward "normalizing" relations with the People's
Republic of China. A little more than 500 days ago, we reached
that historic goal.
It is difficult today to recall the controversy that
surrounded the normalization process. The latest national
polls show that two-thirds of Americans have favorable im-
pressions of China, a stunning reversal of similar polls taken
as recently as 1977. There is clearly a national consensus
to continue to develop the close, friendly, and cooperative
relationships we have already established with the Chinese
people and their government.
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The speed with which we have been able to develop our
bilateral relations with China since January 1, 1979, has
astonished the world. There is no need for me to detail the
remarkable pace of developments in U.S. - China relations
for this knowledgeable audience. In every area, we have
established or are on the verge of establishing much the
same framework for our relations that might have developed
had recognition not been delayed for 30 years.
The fears and doubts that were expressed by opponents at
the time of normalization have proven ill-founded. The high
hopes that we held have been realized or surpassed. Let me
briefly review for you what we have hoped to achieve by




Recall the China we observed in the 1960s -- a nation in
self-inflicted chaos, proclaiming its hope to extend revolu-
tionary turmoil throughout the globe, actively supporting
insurgencies in many areas, armed with primitive nuclear
weapons, vulnerable to outside intervention, isolated and
enraged by international denial of its legitimacy. It seemed
then that China's inevitable entry onto the world stage could
only be profoundly disruptive of world peace and threatening
to our security and that of our friends and allies.
The objectives of this Administration have been clear
from the outset, although they must have seemed to many to
be overly ambitious. We wished:
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- To facilitate China's full entry into the international
community in a way that would contribute to world peace and
stability, not threaten it;
- To acknowledge our national interest in the development
of a strong, secure, prosperous, and friendly China that could
play a legitimate and constructive role in the Asia - Pacific
region and ultimately in the world;
- To defuse contentious issues dividing ourselves from
China, such as the Taiwan issue, and eliminate the danger of
possibly catastrophic miscalculation by an emerging nuclear
and major regional power.
- To develop constructive patterns of consultation with
the Chinese on international issues and build the friendly and
cooperative economic, commercial, cultural, and other relation-
ships with the Chinese necessary to sustain these ends.
These objectives have been or are being achieved under this
Administration
.
As for China itself, that nation is now beginning to
enjoy the international status that long eluded it. The 1
billion people of China have begun to play a role in the mainte-
nance of global peace and stability. The arc from Korea
through Taiwan and the Philippines, at the very center of
great power rivalry and instability for much of this century,
is less subject to these strains today than at any time in
well over 40 years. Longstanding tensions between China, Japan,
and the United States have been replaced with true dialogue
and consultation. For the first time in a century, our three
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countries enjoy close and cooperative relations and share an
interest in the independence, peace, and stability of the
Korean Peninsula.
On the Southeast Asian mainland, the focus of bitter mutual
hostility less than a decade ago, we now share many objectives
in common with China, even though we sometimes still differ on
the appropriate means by which they should be pursued. In
Southwest Asia, we stand together in demanding Soviet with-
drawal from Afghanistan and a halt to Soviet southward expan-
sion. We each place emphasis on bolstering the security of
Pakistan and other neighboring states, while seeking to improve
our respective relations with India.
Our own relations with China are good and steadily
improving. Widespread fears about the implications of "normali
zation" for Taiwan and our flourishing private relationships
with the people of that island have proven groundless.
Although we no longer recognize the Taiwan authorities or
maintain official relations with the island, nongovernmental
relationships with Taiwan's dynamic society and people con-
tinue to prosper, as does Taiwan itself, despite some internal
difficulties. Beijing's threats to "liberate" the island by-
force have been replaced with moderate policies that respect
current realities in Taiwan. Beijing now seeks the re-
establishment of economic, cultural, and other links between
Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Tensions in the
area are now demonstrably at an historic 30-year low.
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Our bilateral relations with the Chinese have been rapidly
consolidated and -- most important in our system of government
institutionalized so that they are no longer dependent on a
few individuals operating in secrecy, as was the case until
the beginning of last year. Broad American interests are
engaged; it would be difficult for any future Administration
to reverse the trend.
By the end of this year we will have completed the con-
struction of the basic legal and institutional framework
within which economic, cultural, scientific, and technological
relationships between the American and Chinese peoples can
develop their full potential. That potential is already being
realized. As many as 100 Chinese delegations now visit our
shores each month. More than 60,000 Americans will visit
China this year. Our trade -- which doubled last year over
the previous year, reaching $2.3 billion -- is continuing its
rapid growth and should exceed $3 billion this year. This
first joint ventures are being concluded between American and
Chinese businessmen.
Finally -- and of vital importance to the prospects for
world peace and stability -- we have established a pattern of
frequent and extremely useful consultation between our highest
leaders and diplomats. A serious dialogue on international
security matters is now taking place in an atmosphere of
friendship and candor. This pattern was set in last year's
historic visits of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and Vice
President Mondale , whose personal direction and prodding of
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our respective bureaucracies have played such an essential
role in the extraordinary growth in our relations. It was
advanced with Secretary of Defense Brown's trip to China in
January, in last week's visit to Washington by Vice Premier
Geng Biao, and in the regular cycle of diplomatic consultation
initiated with the visit if Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wen j in
in March. Several of my colleagues and I will visit Beijing
this summer to continue the dialogue.
The agenda for this period of reconstruction that is now
nearing completion has been simple, virtually self-evident.
We had to sweep aside the misunderstandings and debris of the
past and to fill in the gaps in our relationships caused by
the 50-year absence of normal ties. We are doing so to our
mutual satisfaction.
The Future
But what of the future? Having laid in the 1970s the ground
work for a normal relationship, we now must ask ourselves
what our hopes and objectives should be in the 1980s. We
have only just begun to address this momentous issue. Let
me share with you today some of our preliminary thinking.
Over the 80 years of this century there has been endless
speculation about China's future. But virtually every predic-
tion has been confounded by events, thus suggesting extreme
caution to anyone making predictions even 5 -- still less 20 --
years ahead. Nevertheless, most of the best China experts
I have consulted in the past year feel that China's leaders
have some reason to be hopeful about their country's future.
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It does not appear impossible that Chinese growth rates
through the rest of this century will continue at 6% or per-
haps even 1% annually. China's GNP is now about the size of
ours as it was in the 1920s. Should growth continue at recent
rates, by the year 2000 China's GNP will -- in real terms ---
approach the size of U.S. GNP in the late 1970s. Given China's
enormous population, this would, of course, translate into a
standard of living more like America's in the early 20th
century. Even so, this would be an impressive achievement.
Moreover, national power and influence are determined not
by per capita GNP comparisons but by industrial, scientific,
and technological prowess in the aggregate. A China with a
GNP in the area of $1.5 - 2 trillion will have a weight and
presence in world affairs far beyond that at present. And,
if China can overcome the bureaucratic inertia and difficulties
inherent in managing the destinies of a billion or more people
admittedly a very big "if" -- it will have achieved a degree
of security and capacity for independent action that it lacks
today.
The United States, our allies, and China's neighbors all
have a vital interest in how China may choose to use its
regained power and influence. For over a century, the world
has speculated -- sometimes hopefully, sometimes fearfully --
about what the achievement of Chinese potential might portend.
For over a century, the questions have been the same:
- Will the Chinese be comfortable with a world of
independent, sovereign equal nation-states, or will they
93

revert to the view that others should bow to their centrality
and superiority in a hierarchy of nations?
- Will China prove able to absorb the foreign ideas and
techniques essential to its modernization without relapsing
into xenophobia?
- And, will a wealthy and powerful China direct its immense
energies within itself, or will it prove expansionist?
We cannot predict with certainty the answers to these
difficult questions, any more than we can predict with
certainty the outcome of the great effort now underway in
China to make up for lost time. Some of the answers China's
current leaders give are encouraging. China, they say, is
devoted to a world of independent nation-states coexisting
peacefully on terms of sovereign equality. China, they say,
will modernize both by drawing on its own traditions and on
foreign ideas. It will deal with foreigners -- and with its
neighbors --on the basis of friendship, equality and mutual
benefit
.
Such policies would obviously be in our national interest
as well as China's. It is important that we encourage those
trends that deepen China's involvement with the West and Japan.
In short, our policies should seek to insure that China's
answers to these questions continue to coincide with our own





The principles that will govern our China policy for the
decades to come are therefore already clear.
First
.
We will develop our relations with China on their
own merits. It is the business of diplomacy not only to
gauge the reactions of our potential adversaries but also to
measure policy with respect to the interests of our allies.
We will enhance our nation's prosperity and security and that
of our allies by developing our relations with China in a way
that takes full and adequate account of all the external
factors that are affected by them. While strategic factors
remain a central consideration in our relations, the famous
triangular diplomacy of the early 1970s is no longer an
adequate conceptual framework in which to view relations with
China. Broad American interests are engaged, as are those
of allies and friends in a world of increasingly complex
interplay among power centers such as Japan, the Association
of South East Asian Nations, India, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, and Western Europe.
We welcome the emergence of China on the world scene as an
active participant in global and regional affairs, thus ending
China's long isolation and relative noninvolvement in the
international arena and multilateral diplomacy. China is
beginning to play an important role in more and more issues --





In short, relations with China are not a simple function
of our relations with the Soviet Union, although the pace of
their advance has been and will continue to be influenced by-
changes in the international environment. As Chairman Mao
told us privately as early as 1973, the United States must
not attempt to stand on China's shoulders to strike at the
Soviet Union. His statement is true notwithstanding the fact
that for China, as for ourselves, the question of how to deal
with growing Soviet power and assertiveness in the world is,
and will remain, a central issue of foreign policy. Each of
us has other interests and is concerned with other issues as
well. Our perspectives and our policies may be parallel from
time to time; but they will rarely be identical. Our societies
rest on quite different philosophic assumptions and our values
and institutions diverge in many ways. In the absence of
frontal assaults on our common interests, we will remain --
as at present -- friends, rather than allies.
Second. Our new friendship with China need not and will
not be pursued at the expense of our relationships with others.
On the contrary, the effectiveness of our China policy depends
in part upon the enhancement of our role in the Asia - Pacific
region, and that role is in turn strengthened by our growing,
constructive ties with China.
Our recognition of China's importance in the Asia - Pacific
region does not mean that we intend to default on our own role
or to entrust it to the Chinese. There will be no "division
of labor" with China in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. Each of
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us has our own interests, as do Japan and other countries of
the region. Our relations with China are founded on respect
for this fact.
The United States will remain a major Pacific power,
vitally interested in the stability of the western Pacific, of
Northeast and Southeast Asia, and of other areas on the rim
of China. We will maintain and enhance our already strong
military, political, economic, and cultural presence in the
area. Doing so is important to our Asian friends and allies,
and should be welcome to the Chinese as evidence of our in-
tention neither to pursue hegemony nor to permit others to
pursue it in the Asia - Pacific region.
Third
. We will continue to recognize our national
interest in a friendly and successfully modernizing China. Our
policies on technology transfer are evolving to reflect this
interest.
China and the United States are both continental societies
whose foreign policies are decisively influenced by our domestic
political and economic situations. Should China relapse into
economic stagnation, xenophobia, or ideological frenzy born
of frustration, the consequences for world order would be
profound. Should China be unable to maintain peaceful
relationships of equality and mutual benefit with the nations of
of the region, its domestic aspirations could prove unattainable
Should China fall still further behind its more advanced neigh-
bors, its role in the maintenance of global balance would be
eroded, to the profound disadvantage not only of China but of
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the United States and our allies as well. An economic or
political vacuum in China has not served the interests of
stability in the world in the past; it would not do so in
future
.
More positively, we - - and the world -- have much to gain
from a revitalized China, not only in terms of trade and
economic exchange but also in terms of scientific and tech-
nological interchange. The Chinese are a talented people who,
in the broad sweep of world history, have often in the past
led the advance in human knowledge and the quality of life --
and can do so again.
The very size of China makes its experiment in moderniza-
tion unique and gives us all a special interest in the character
of its success. To illustrate: Imagine the consequences for
the quality of the environment in the northern hemisphere if
a billion or more Chinese were to fail to learn from our
mistakes and to industrialize to our levels without imposing
pollution controls. Imagine the consequences for world energy
supplies should a modernized China be forced to turn to massive
imports to sustain its agriculture, industry, and commerce.
Clearly, we have a stake not only in China's successful
modernization but also in how it modernizes. Our rapidly
developing scientific and technological exchanges with the
Chinese reflect this interest. It should be a source of some
satisfaction that China, in pursuing modernization, has asked





We will continue to pursue our interest in a
strong, peaceful, and secure China. A China confident in its
ability to defend its borders against foreign aggression
enhances stability in the Pacific and on the Eurasion landmass
and therefore contributes to our own security and that of
our allies.
We do not sell arms to China or engage in joint military
planning arrangements with the Chinese. The current inter-
national situation does not justify our doing so. Neither
we nor the Chinese seek such an alliance relationship.
Nevertheless, we can and will assist China's drive to improve
its security by permitting appropriate technology transfer,
including the sale of carefully selected items of dual use
technology and defensive military support equipment. We have
begun to do so.
We will continue to consider such transactions individu-
ally on their merits as they arise, taking into account our
own security interests and those of others in the region.
Vice Premier Geng Biao's visit to the United States this week
and last has marked another step forward in this policy.
His discussions with Defense Secretary Brown, with the President,
the Vice President, and the Secretary of State have played a
key role in defining what is now desirable and possible in
terms of a modest American contribution to China's massive
modernization needs.
Secretary Brown's and Vice Premier Geng's visits have also
initiated a process of regular contact and dialogue between
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our respective defense establishments. We expect these useful
exchanges to broaden and grow in the years to come.
Fifth
. We will continue to adhere scrupulously to our
normalization understandings with respect to Taiwan. The
past 18 months have shown that the full range of private
American relationships with the people of Taiwan can prosper
in the absence of any official U.S. relations with the island.
The Taiwan Relations Act provides a firm grounding in our
domestic law under which such unofficial relationships continue
to flourist.
The act also establishes our concern for the continued
peace and security of the Taiwan area. Our policy will remain
consistent with the act and with our abiding interest in a
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by the parties directly
concerned.
Within this context, the nature and form of Taiwan's ulti-
mate relationships with the mainland of China are for the
Chinese on both sides of the strait to determine. It would be
presumptuous for Americans to attempt to do so. Nor would we
impede the process of their reconciliation.
Sixth . We will actively pursue our efforts to enlist the
energies and talents of the Chinese people in global efforts
to address the common problems of humankind. It is obvious
that no such problem -- whether of the environment, of food
and population, of global energy and resource management, of
economic development, technology transfer or arms control --
can be successfully addressed without the positive participation
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and contribution of China. We are encouraged by Chinese
interest and cooperation with us on these vital issues in
this initial period. We hope to work closely with the Chinese
Government and people in the United Nations and in other
international organizations and fora to insure continued
progress toward a better quality of life for all on this
planet
.
In sum, the 1980s begin with Sino-American relations
entering the stage of maturity. They are firmly grounded
on both sides in enlightened self-interest and mutual respect.
Sino-American normalization has worked. Its immense promise
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